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Abstract 
This thesis examines the concept of new digital service pricing from a theoretical and an 
empirical point of view. Theoretically the topic was approached by summarizing materials in 
pricing frameworks from 1950 until 2016 to be applied for a model that may assist managers 
making pricing decisions for new digital services. The model consist of four parts representing the 
identification of: Value creation and value drivers, market strategy and corporate objectives, the 
competitive price range and lastly pricing strategy in the form of a scheduled set of final prices 
with the objective to maximize total discounted lifetime profits. 
 
The starting point for the empirical study was to adopt the conceptual and measurement model 
by Ingenbleek et al. (2013) which was modified to the needs of  digital services. A new scale is 
developed for cost-informed pricing while the scales for relative cost and relative price are 
modified to better suit pricing research in the digital services industry. Upon testing the 
conceptual framework, suggestions for further modifications are proposed. Most notably, a new 
construct for market potential should be included. Further issues not currently covered by the 
framework are value transparency and the more complex structure of the final set of prices, as 
opposed to the study of a final single price point. A recommendation is also made for the 
reimagination of the outcome variables to better approximate total discounted lifetime profits. 
 
     The proposed effects had to be studied in an exploratory manner as a cause of the small sample 
obtained (N=20). Careful support is given to the proposition of value-informed pricing having a 
positive effect on market performance. Higher use of value-informed pricing also seem to increase 
the variance in relative price, which leads to the hypothesis that a construct for market potential 
should be included in the conceptual framework. Careful support is also found for the proposition 
that the negative impact of cost-informed pricing on relative price is larger when relative service 
advantage is high. Competitive intensity might affect market performance negatively, while the 
effect on relative price was inconclusive. 
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1 Introduction 
When launching a new product or service, pricing is a highly complex decision puzzling 
top management around the world (Ingenbleek et al. 2013; Dean 1976). Too often, the 
management responsible for the decision does not have the required expertise to take these 
decisions, nor the money to hire pricing consultants as expensive as they are rare (Jensen 
2013). Jensen states that an annual pricing conference is the U.S. typically only draws 30-40 
people. In Europe, the EADA pricing research center was the first of its kind in history and 
established as late as 2011. Traditionally, new product pricing has been viewed as the choice 
between market skimming and market penetration pricing. Despite the call for more complex 
approaches, papers on the subject have been few and far between (Ingenbleek 2013). As a 
result of this lack of pricing knowledge in companies today prices may often be set too low. 
Urbany (2001) shows that managers might routinely set prices too low in order to 
aggressively buy market share or because of fear of being overpriced as compared to 
competitors. This behavior will too often lead to damaging industry wide price cuts that hurt 
the profitability of all participants in price-wars. Marn et al. (2003) state that, in their 
experience, 80-90 % of new offerings are priced too low. They also argue that underpricing is 
a far larger problem than overpricing since high prices can be cut while low prices are 
cemented in customer’s minds as reference prices, making it hard or impossible to raise 
prices by much. The foregone profits of such mistakes are substantial in many industries. 
Cressman (1999) noticed an alarming absence of value-informed approaches in the pricing 
taxonomy by Noble and Grucca (1999), criticizing the internal focus of these pricing 
practices and called for action in order to educate managers on more modern value-informed 
approaches. Also, even if new product advantage over competition is considered one of the 
strongest predictors of new product performance (Henard & Szymanski 2001), a recent study 
has shown evidence that wrongful pricing practices can erode the effect of a significant 
product advantage (Ingenbleek et al. 2013). This shows us evidence that all the hard work put 
into product development might be lost if the wrong pricing decisions are made. 
The Director of EADA’s Pricing Center Manu Carricano does however note several 
hints at the growing importance of pricing in organizations (EADA View). First, Carricano 
notes that pricing seems to have developed an entirely new function within organizations in 
the last 10-15 years. It is also more and more common to see Chief Pricing Officers in 
organizations. Second, Carricano cites research stating that a 1 % improvement in price has 
an impact on profit in the range 8-11 %, while a 1 % improvement in cost reduction only 
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increases profits by 3-7 %. Value improvements of 1 % only impact profits by 2 %. In 
today’s digital, global and fast-paced competitive environment, firms now more than ever 
feel the pressure to act on these opportunities (EADA View). There is a clear correlation 
between the rising importance of pricing and the rise of the internet, as the internet provided 
the infrastructure needed for full globalization and greater price transparency (Homburg et al. 
2009; Marn et al. 2003). In Europe, the introduction of a common currency has also 
contributed to increased price transparency between countries. With this background in mind, 
we cannot expect the importance of good pricing principles to go away anytime soon. 
One issue with pricing is that price itself represents more than one thing, and is thus complex. 
Price in its most basic form is what the customer pays, while price from a more customer 
oriented view is what values the customer has to give up in order to get the benefits of the 
offer (Lauterborn 1990). This can include not only money, but also time spent searching for 
information, retrieving the product or a conscious cost in form of guilt. Dean calls this cost 
for the customer (Dean, 1976).  Deciding what price to set is also not an isolated decision. 
Nowadays it is well known that prospects can use price as an indicator of quality (Rao, 
Monroe, 1989). The price also has a designated spot in the traditional marketing mix, and it is 
recommended to be set in harmony with the other parts of the marketing mix. Armstrong and 
Kotler (2006) states that a price will ultimately be set between a price ceiling, above which 
there is no demand for the product, and a price floor, below which the company cannot turn a 
profit. In between these points, the price will vary as a cause of marketing strategy, objectives 
and mix, the nature of the market and demand, competitors’ strategies and prices as well as 
“a number of internal and external factors”. The establishment of this competitive price range 
is supported by many researchers (e.g. Monroe, 2003; Nagle, Hogan, Zale, 2016; Marn et al., 
2003; Jensen, 2013). Much like a stock price reflects all publicly available information on a 
company, the price a company put on its product reflects on the company’s strategy as well 
as its communicated quality, among other things. Hence, it is important to set a price 
consistent with the rest of the company’s objectives (Dean 1973; Ingenbleek et al. 2013; 
Nagle, Hogan, Zale, 2016).  
Even if price is a component of the marketing strategy as a whole, it is also a part of 
the marketing mix that has some distinct features that should be highlighted. Homburg et al. 
(2009) points out four distinct features of pricing as part of the marketing mix. First, they 
point out that pricing decisions can be implemented relatively quickly as compared to other 
instruments in the marketing mix. Second, they point out that pricing decisions are “Hardly 
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reversible”. By this they mean that a fixed price works as a point of reference for customers 
and prospects, it is against this point of reference later price changes are evaluated. Here, 
Marn et al. (2003) argue that this effect is stronger when trying to raise prices, as opposed to 
lowering them. This also falls in line with prospect theory, which states that people 
experience losses as worse than corresponding gains (Kahnemann 2012). Lastly, they point 
out that pricing decisions have a major impact since the price set is what customers are giving 
up to get the value of the product or service. Accordingly, pricing decisions also have a fast 
impact leading to rapid customer responses in many markets. 
 Summarized, we can see that pricing has a major impact on the profitability of firms. 
Price decisions and responses to price introductions and changes are also relatively rapid as 
opposed to other parts of the marketing mix. Though holistic research on pricing frameworks 
has been scarce and simplistic, this thesis will try to find common ground between both 
academics and practitioners in order to present a conceptual model to analyze new digital 
service pricing. In the empirical part, I am adopting the conceptual framework and scales of 
Ingenbleek et al. (2013) which are modified to better suit pricing research in the digital 
services industry. A completely new scale is developed suitable for the analyzing of digital 
service pricing, while several other items are modified to suit pricing research in this 
industry. The thesis ends with testing of propositions and other exploratory results before 
concluding with a discussion of these results. 
1.1 Research Questions and Objectives 
This thesis aims to find consensus among academics and practitioners in order to find a 
conceptual framework suitable for new digital service pricing. The empirical part of the 
thesis aims to develop scales and items suitable for pricing research in the digital service 
industry and to test the viability of proposed effects in an exploratory manner. Based on the 
findings in this thesis, suggestions for future research are made. Accordingly, this thesis aims 
to answer the following questions: 
1. What insights for new digital service pricing are there to be gained from the pricing 
literature? 
2. How should the conceptual framework by Ingenbleek et al. (2013) be changed to be 
more suitable for research on digital service pricing? 
3. What best-practices can be identified? 
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1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
The theoretical part of the thesis examined holistic pricing papers and books on pricing 
from 1950 to today. As the aim of the study is to find consensus among academics as well as 
practitioners, common themes were identified and structured in a new pricing conceptual 
model. The empirical part utilizes the conceptual framework developed by Ingenbleek et al. 
(2013) and modifies the scales used to better suit pricing research in the digital services 
industry. The new measures are tested using exploratory factor analysis and reliability tests. 
Lastly, proposed effects are tested in an exploratory manner. 
The thesis starts with a literature review, structured after the final new digital service 
pricing model. Thereafter, in the methods section, research methods and statistical methods 
are presented on a theoretical level. The thesis continues with a chapter on survey design, 
which includes construct and scale development building on the conceptual framework by 
Ingenbleek et al. (2013). Six proposed effects are described in the propositions section before 
the results are presented. The thesis ends with a discussion on the contributions, limitations, 
and suggestions for further research. 
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1.3 Terminology 
Reference price: The benchmark price buyers refer to when evaluating offered prices 
(Arsmtrong & Kotler 2006; De Mayer & Estelami 2013; Erdem et al. 2010). 
Reference value: The price of the next best offer (Nagle, Hogan, and Zale, 2016). 
Pricing Strategy: “a set of alternative prices (or price schedules) that aim at profit 
maximization within a planning period in response to a given scenario.” (Tellis, 1986) An 
alternative view is the traditional differentiation between skimming and penetration pricing 
strategies (Dean, 1976). In this thesis, the definition by Tellis (1986) is used. 
Price-setting practice: “the set of activities executed by an prganization’s managers that 
lead to a price decision” (Ingenbleek et al., 2003). 
Competitive Price Range: The pricing choice space between a price ceiling and a price 
floor. The term competitive price range, or range of competitive prices, derives from Dean 
(1976). Other terms used are price discretion (Monroe, 2003) and price window (Nagle, 
Hogan, and Zale, 2016). 
Value Transparency: The degree to which prospects are aware of and understand the 
differential value delivered. (Anderson et al., 2010) 
Digital Service: “Any activity or benefit that one party can give to another, that is, 
essentially intangible and does not result in the ownership of anything.” (Kotler and 
Armstrong, 2006)  Additionally, the definition in this thesis requires the digital service to 
have zero variable cost. The digital service can still incur stepwise fixed cost as shown by 
Huang and Sundararajan (2011). 
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2 Literature Review 
In the pricing literature reviewed, ten pricing frameworks were mainly utilized. The 
oldest was Oxenfeldt’s 1960 framework with the most recent being the updated 2016 
framework of Nagle, Hogan and Zale. Reviewing common themes in these ten frameworks, 
as well as other supporting literature, a summarized model for analyzing new digital service 
pricing consisting of four broad steps was developed. The ten papers and books laying the 
groundwork for the new model in this thesis are shown in table 1. 
Table 1. Pricing Literature Mainly Utilized for the New Digital Service Pricing Model.   
Author(s) Title Year 
Oxenfeldt Multi-stage approach to pricing 1960 
Welsh A planned approach to new product pricing 1968 
Dean Pricing policies for new products 1976 
Monroe Pricing: Making Profitable Decisions 2003 
Marn et al. Pricing New Products 2003 
Dixit et al. A taxonomy of information technology-enchanced pricing strategies 2008 
Anderson et al. Why the highest price isn’t the best price 2010 
Deeter & Jung Software as a Service Pricing Strategies 2013 
Iveroth et al. How to differentiate by price: Proposal for a five-dimensional model 2013 
Nagle et al. The Strategy and Tactics of Pricing 2016 
 
 Among the themes recognized early on there was the need to price over the whole life-
cycle and the need to take competitors’ reactions into consideration (e.g. Dean, 1976; Welsh, 
1968), while formal value-based approaches to pricing, on which there was consistent 
approval, was introduced about thirty years later. This section will present the conceptual 
new digital service pricing model in figure 1 by going over the steps of the conceptual model 
one by one. It is, however, important to recognize that pricing should take a holistic approach 
where each part interact with one and another (e.g. Nagle, Hogan, and Zale, 2016; Dean, 
1976), instead of a pure stepwise approach. For educational purposes, the conceptual model 
is still presented as a stepwise process with step-order based on what lays the foundation for 
the next step.  
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Figure 1. New Digital Service Pricing Model 
 
The model starts by identifying how a company creates value through its service and 
how the pricing should be structured in order to best capture this value. Then the company’s 
strategy for the market and its impact on pricing is taken into consideration along with price 
and value communication strategies. Next, the competitive price range is identified, which is 
the range of prices between the lowest and highest possible price and different scenarios in 
this range are evaluated. Lastly, the company arrives at its pricing strategy, which is the final 
set of prices to be offered over the lifecycle. For digital services, the same underlying 
principles comply, which is considered important for the purpose of this thesis. Key 
differences between digital services, and ordinary products and services are the ease of 
versioning the options of pricing models available. 
2.1 Value Creation and Value Drivers 
The first step of any pricing decision is to truly understand how a company’s service is 
creating value for its customers (Nagle, Hogan, Zale, 2016; Deeter and Jung, 2013). Part of 
this understanding of value creation is to identify value drivers. Is the service generating time 
savings, cost savings, more sales leads or reduced risk? These are examples of monetary 
value drivers, which are already quantifiable, and hence, fairly easy to estimate. 
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Psychological value drivers, such as satisfaction and ease of use, are much harder to quantify 
but just as important. There are many methods available for estimating psychological value, 
of which conjoint analysis is the most widely used (Green et al., 2001). Conjoint analysis 
allow the researcher to make trade-offs between service attributes (Green et al., 2001). The 
results can be useful for pricing purposes as well as research and development. These two 
functions of a company should follow in parallel as both are interested in what service 
attributes drive customer value. There is no need for R&D to develop features that customers 
do not value (Nagle, Hogan, Zale, 2016). Anderson et al. (2010) point out the benefits of 
involving customers in the development process in order to better align service features with 
those that customers are willing to pay for. Accordingly, pricing research can be a very 
effective tool for identifying development opportunities as it creates a direct link between 
features and customer value. Marn et al. (2003) also point out the importance of in depth 
interviews with the customers or prospects in order to find potential hidden values that would 
not be visible with formalized approaches for analysis alone. 
When the drivers behind value creation have been identified, they need to be quantified. 
Nagle, Hogan and Zale (2016) recommend the use of the term economic value, from 
economics, to have a unified and distinctive measure of value. The economic value is 
interpreted as the maximum price a purchaser would be willing to pay. It is based on two 
other types of values: Reference value and differential value. The reference value is the price 
of the next best offer. Differential value, on the other hand, is the positive or negative value 
of any features or attributes added or missing as compared to the reference offer. The 
economic value is then calculated as the price of the next best offer plus positive differential 
value minus negative differential value. Anderson et al. (2010) agree with this approach 
assigning a whole step in his approach to the adequate identification of the next best offer, 
since the use of total customer value can often be misleading and lead to overpricing. This 
view is supported by Marn et al. (2003) as they state that the optimal price can be less than 
the maximum value for a number of different reasons. A real world example of this is 
Spotify. What is the value of a having a music collection that large on every device? For 
obvious reasons, a total customer value approach was not appropriate. Instead, they identified 
the average spend on CD’s and doubled that number for their premium service (Spotify for 
Artists). Figure 2 illustrate the calculation of economic value. 
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Figure 2. Economic Value 
 
The economic value estimated here should not be interpreted as the final price. It is more 
of an agreement as to what value should be measured throughout the price-setting processes. 
There are many more considerations to be made before a final price optimal price can be 
estimated. 
 Once the value to the customers has been established on a general level, companies 
should research the possibilities for segmentation. Note that segmentation should not be done 
on arbitrary variables, but rather on variables that directly affect purchase motivation (Nagle, 
Hogan, Zale, 2016) or those that are most important to the buyer (Deeter & Jung, 2013) and 
hence perceived value. Segmenting on these types of variables, different values can be 
extracted from the segments and present an opportunity to price discriminate (Deeter and 
Jung, 2013). Nagle, Hogan and Zale (2016) call this value-based segmentation. As the name 
indicates, companies should strive to segment on the variables where the service delivers 
value for the customer. For example, a 3D visualization service for architects probably would 
have higher value for a large company working with large deals than it would for students of 
architecture that might get no income from the service at all. Value-based segmentation 
requires careful thought in order to appropriately determine the correct discriminating value 
drivers for each segment. Choosing the wrong value driver will ultimately lead to the 
company focusing on delivering the wrong value. Deeter and Jung (2013) identify three 
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common criteria for segmentation equaling those of Tellis (1986) characteristics of 
consumers (in determining pricing strategy to pursue): differences in search costs, differences 
in reservation prices (willingness-to-pay) and special transaction costs. In determining the 
most appropriate segments to focus on, companies should also focus on their operational 
advantages and disadvantages (Nagle, Hogan, and Zale, 2016). Again emphasizing the 
holistic approach to pricing, companies should ask themselves what segments they can serve 
more efficiently than other segments (Oxenfeldt, 1960; Nagle, Hogan, Zale, 2016). While the 
question is important, further exploration is beyond the scope of this thesis. For a full six-step 
analysis for value-based segmentation, see Nagle, Hogan, and Zale (2016). 
 The last step of the segmentation procedure is to identify what Nagle, Hogan, and 
Zale (2016) call metrics, fences and price-offer configuration. This can be understood to be 
equivalent to that other researchers call pricing models. Metrics are the measure for how 
customers receive and pay for value (e.g. fare per km for taxi rides) while fences are what 
rules customers have to follow or fulfill in order to qualify for a discount compared to higher 
priced segments (volume or student discounts). Price-offer configuration is a literal 
description of bundling and unbundling options of features in order to best serve customers 
service requirements and willingness to pay. Iveroth et al. (2013) proposed a five-
dimensional model with the aim of helping companies to differentiate by price through 
pricing models. The model’s five dimensions are scope, base, influence, formula and 
temporal rights. This abbreviates to simply the SBIFT model.  
The first dimension, scope, equals the price-offer configuration of Nagle, Hogan, and 
Zale (2016), or the granularity of the offer from a full bundled package to a pay-per-attribute 
model. The second dimension, base, refers to the competitive price range, or the choice to set 
a price close to the maximum or minimum realistic price or somewhere in-between. We will 
return to the competitive price-range later. Influence reflects the degree to who determines 
the final price, from a company determined price-list to pay-what-you-want-pricing or the 
occasional exogenous pricing, where price is out of influence from both seller and buyer 
(such as when it is tied to an index). The last two dimensions bear similarities with the earlier 
mentioned metrics by Nagle, Hogan, and Zale (2016). Formula is simply a description of how 
price is connected with volume, while temporal rights describe how long customers have the 
right to use the offering. Figure 3 describes the five-dimensional model by Iveroth et al. 
(2013). 
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Figure 3. The SBIFT Model (Iveroth et al. (2013). 
 
While going into more detail on the processes to arrive at an optimal pricing model is 
out of the scope of this thesis, it is deemed sufficient to state that companies can use these 
price modeling tools and concepts in order to experiment with different pricing models. The 
general goal should always be to identify pricing models where price aligns as closely as 
possible to the value received by the customer. The tools here incorporate all most common 
pricing models such as tiered and consumption models. The freemium pricing model is 
notably missing, since it is actually as much of a value communication tool as a pricing 
model. Hence, more information on the freemium pricing model will be presented in the 
section covering value communication. 
2.2 Corporate Objectives and Strategy 
Corporate objectives are very much dependent on the company strategy, and so should 
also pricing be (Dean, 1976; Nagle, Hogan, Zale, 2016; Anderson et al., 2010). The definition 
of corporate objectives should be understood as “what does the company want to accomplish 
in this segment”. The objective should not be just to “sell more”, instead rather more 
sophisticated objectives aimed at improving and maintaining profitability should be stated 
(Anderson et al., 2010; Nagle, Hogan, Zale, 2016). For example, companies might accept 
lower profits for a service if they think they can lock in customers for upsells to a more 
profitable segment. As with company strategy, pricing strategy should also be dependent on 
what competitive advantage the company has. The character of the service and the type of 
market the service is to be introduced also play a critical role in determining corporate 
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objectives. For example, entering a new market requires a different strategy than introducing 
an evolutionary service to an old market. Accordingly, different corporate objectives, and 
hence pricing guidelines, should be set (Anderson et al., 2010). Also in the traditional 
marketing mix, it is recommended that price should be aligned with the other elements of the 
marketing mix (Homburg et al., 2009; Oxenfeldt, 1960). The market potential also plays a 
crucial role in determining corporate objectives, as it sets the stage for the total collectable 
profits for the service and whether to pursue a relatively high or low price (Dean, 1976). The 
higher the market potential, the larger the threat from existing and potential competitors is as 
well. On the other hand, some companies do indeed have a competitive advantage through 
cost efficiency. This is the only way a company can motivate competing on price (Nagle, 
Hogan, Zale, 2016). 
Once the company has clear objectives in line with the company strategy for continued 
profitability, there is one more dimension with which companies should align their 
objectives. The important question is; what is the differential value that is transparent to 
customers?” (Anderson et al., 2010) In other words, do the potential customers understand 
the differential value of the service? This dimension requires companies to formulate value 
communication strategies, should the differential value not be transparent. Some companies 
bringing cost-savings to the table offer their customers calculators that estimate potential 
cost-savings from the service based on the customers’ own data. Others spend money on 
educating the potential customers through advertising or other media (Dean, 1976). 
According to Nagle, Hogan, and Zale (2016), the value communication strategy is dependent 
on two dimensions; relative cost of search and type of benefits. Type of benefits can be 
economic or psychological, while relative cost of search can be high or low. Most digital 
services have high relative search costs, as users will often have to spend time using the 
service in order to realize at least some of its value, notably user experience (while some 
economic benefits can be proved with statistics). Services with high relative cost of search 
fall in the category of experience goods, and they can be especially tricky from a value 
communication point of view. As Shapiro put it in his 1983 paper on optimal pricing of 
experience goods: “…as buyers learn about the product, the demand curve shifts over time.” 
(Shapiro, 1983) Shapiro also show that a two-step pricing scheme is optimal when consumers 
underestimate the quality of a service good. Specifically, a low introductory price followed 
by a higher maintained price. Introductory offers have been common in the marketplace for a 
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long time, but only recently have the most special case of introductory offers been introduced 
to the marketplace – the freemium model.  
Generally considered a pricing model (e.g. Deeter and Jung, 2013) it is also a value 
communication tool. The freemium model allows users to get acquainted with a version of 
the service with limited functionality for free, while prompting for upgrade to a paid premium 
version should the user wish full functionality (Shankarananda, 2015). There is indeed some 
magic with the word “free”. Shampan’er and Ariely showed in an experiment, having people 
to choose between two products, one cheap priced at one cent and one premium product 
priced at fourteen cents, that decreasing the price of both products with one cent to zero had 
an abnormally positive effect on how many people chose the now free product. The 
difference is in fact so large that decreasing the price to zero not only affects people’s 
perceived added value through the lower price, but in fact also seem to raise the valuation of 
the good itself (Shampan’er, Ariely 2007). Prospects might also be cautious because of the 
endowment effect, stating that out-of-pocket costs are viewed as losses while the opportunity 
cost of using a service is seen as a foregone gain (Thaler 1980). In prospect theory, this 
means that there will be a discount in the valuation of the foregone gains causing the out-of-
pocket cost to be disproportionally large (Kahnemann, 2012). 
While the freemium model has shown itself to work well for building market share 
and adoption, it is also a model that requires certain elements to be profitable. One of these 
elements is scale. Since freemium businesses often see their share of premium users as low as 
2-5 % (Shankarananda, 2015), they must address a large market in order to gain profitability. 
The second element is service features, as companies deciding on a freemium model must 
strike a delicate balance between offering too much or too little in the free version. Offering 
too much could cannibalize on premium sales, since there would be no need to upgrade, 
while offering too little could slow down adoption or even drive customers away as they fail 
to see the true value of the service (Lee, Gupta, Kumar, 2013). Recently, more innovative 
models for pricing and value communication has come up such as paidmium, which allow 
users to experience applications first-hand but offer in-app purchases to build revenue 
(Shankararanda, 2015). 
Summarized, companies can communicate value by educating customers through 
advertising, tools, or by allowing them to experience a full or limited version of the service 
first-hand for a specific or indefinite time. Understanding corporate objectives in line with 
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value transparency, company strategy, and market potential will help managers in 
determining what the best total profit-maximizing pricing strategy would be in the long term. 
2.3 The Competitive Price Range 
Once managers understand how its service drives customer value and what part of that 
value is transparent, the company strategy and objectives suitable for the market they are 
operating in, it is time to determine the range of realistic or possible prices. Research efforts 
have placed comparatively much effort on this stage, as it provides a natural starting point 
when companies think about what price to set (e.g. Ingenbleek et al., 2013; Marn et al., 2003; 
Dean, 1976; Monroe, 2003). The basic idea is to identify the possible range of prices between 
a price ceiling and a price floor. Monroe (2003) separates this identification into two steps. 
First, companies determine an initial competitive price range. Then, factors that shrink this 
range are identified, such as downward pressure from competitive factors and upwards 
pressure from corporate objectives or regulatory constraints. Besides identifying the 
maximum and minimum prices that create the boundaries for the competitive price range, 
companies should also identify reference price points in that range to better understand the 
competitive landscape (Jensen, 2013; Nagle, Hogan, Zale, 2016). A reference price is the 
benchmark price buyers refer to when evaluating offered prices (Arsmtrong & Kotler 2006; 
De Mayer & Estelami 2013; Erdem et al. 2010). All of these points, including price floor and 
ceiling, should be established separately for each segment (Nagle, Hogan, Zale, 2016). 
The price ceiling is the maximum realistically obtainable price and is dependent on 
customers’ perception of value delivered by the service (Ingenbleek et al., 2003; Dean, 1976). 
Based on the findings when the company first researched how the service creates value for its 
customers, they should now turn this value into the highest possible price above which there 
is no demand (Armstrong, Kotler, 2006). While this price may not be realistic for a variety of 
reasons, such as too low demand, customers buying power leaving or competitive forces, it 
ensures that all possible prices are thought of (Marn et al., 2003; Ingenbleek et al., 2003; 
Henard, Szymanski, 2001). As discussed earlier, value transparency is also a key factor that 
can put downwards pressure on the price ceiling. 
The price floor, on the other hand, is the lowest possible price at which the company still 
will remain profitable. Though cost-informed pricing generally is considered bad practice as 
the sole form of pricing information (e.g. Heymann, 1980; Dean, 1976), it still holds an 
important role in determining the price floor (Nagle, Hogan, Zale, 2016; Marn et al., 2003). 
 Literature Review 
 
 19  
 
Determining an appropriate price floor is especially useful for “birth-control” of new 
services, as the company can estimate whether the service will generate at least minimum 
return on investment. As pointed out by Marn et al. (2003), companies still often overlook 
important costs when determining their price floor. For example, all research and 
development expenses should be included, also costs for incomplete projects as these will 
affect the minimum rate of return a company requires from all its services. Goodwill from 
acquisitions that lead directly to new services should also be accounted for. For digital 
services, determining a cost floor is especially difficult since their cost structure usually 
comprise of a large share of fixed costs. In order to get an accurate estimate of a cost floor, 
accurate estimates of volume are needed (Ingenbleek et al., 2003). This increases the 
ambiguity of the cost floor for digital services. Marn et al. (2003), Jensen (2013), and Dean 
(1976) recommend that several volume estimates are made for each price point, or that a 
sensitivity analysis is performed. This is also important so that the company later can make 
accurate price-volume trade-offs when determining the final set of prices (Nagle, Hogan, 
Zale, 2016). 
 It can also be effective to analyze the prices of competitors. Methods of competition-
informed pricing have taken a lot of critique over the years as a cause of its simplistic 
structure (copy-pasting competitors’ prices), but used correctly it has been shown to give 
companies important knowledge of their competitive price range. Ingenbleek et al. (2013), 
show that competition-informed pricing practices can be useful in stable markets when the 
product advantage is high. Presumably, this is due to prices being set below prospects 
reference prices, which according to prospect theory should give a larger choice share to the 
new service or product (Kahnemann 2012). Ingenbleek et al. (2013) also show the benefit of 
competition-informed pricing in markets where the company’s relative product advantage is 
high and relative costs are low. The reason for this lies in numerical cognition literature. The 
authors explain that people make larger estimation mistakes when comparing a stack of 10 
items against a stack of 100 items, as opposed to comparing a stack of 90 items against a 
stack of 100 items. Then, in the case when product advantage is high, and accordingly the 
price ceiling should be high, and the relative costs of the firm are low, and correspondingly a 
low price floor as well, companies might be better of focusing more on the price of the 
competition as opposed to their own cost in order to get a more accurate estimate of the price-
ceiling through value informed pricing. Jensen (2013) on the other hand stresses the value of 
the information companies can get from competitors’ sales and prices. Much like conjoint 
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analysis, Jensen recommends that companies do a thorough mapping of competitors’ 
attributes and prices in order to get a complete view of the competitive landscape. By 
objectively comparing your product to those of your direct and indirect competitors, you can 
often get a decent sense of what your prospects value and are ready to pay. With all these 
additional price points established, the competitive price range of the new product should 
now feel more tangible as to what is expected at each price point. 
Nagle, Hogan, and Zale (2016) rely on economic and differentiation value in order to 
establish the competitive price range. They identify the price ceiling similarly to other 
models, equal to the economic value. The approach to the price floor is split into two 
possibilities. If the product is positively differentiated, the price floor is the reference price of 
the next best offering. It is only if the service is negatively differentiated that the price floor is 
established by relevant costs. The approach is illustrated in figure 4. 
Figure 4. Price Range for Positively and Negatively Differentiated Offerings. 
                               
   
The authors stress the importance of allowing negatively differentiated services to keep 
their low prices in order to maintain a stable market. Engaging in a pricing war with these 
services would hurt profits for the whole industry. If a negatively differentiated service is 
faced with a cut in a competitor’s price, they are wise to respond as this is the only option 
they have (at least in the short term). Competitors’ reactions in general is a topic that has 
been present in many pricing models since the beginning (Welsh, 1968; Dean, 1976) and has 
continued to play an important role until this day (Marn et al., 2003; Nagle, Hogan, Zale, 
2016) since pricing should be performed over the whole life-cycle. A large risk with high 
competitive intensity is the risk of price war, where total industry profits typically fall and all 
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participators loose. This is negative-sum competition, which should be avoided. Another 
example would be war of nations, where all participants end up losing resources. Negative-
sum competition is distinctive from positive-sum competition, such as sports or research and 
development efforts, where all participants have something to gain. If nothing else, 
experience is gained for the next time. When facing the threat of negative-sum competition, 
such as price wars, managers should carefully consider the consequences of their actions as 
the negative consequences could often be irreversible. Accordingly, setting the price of a new 
service, managers should not necessarily try to outprice their competitor, if their competitor 
has a cost advantage that is non-achievable for the company itself (Nagle, Hogan, Zale, 
2016). Should the introduced service present a significant threat to the competitor, they 
would probably follow through on the price-cut in order to protect market share. That is, if 
this price-cut would be less costly than the cost of losing market share. Chen and MacMillan 
(1992) showed that competitors are indeed more likely to respond and to respond quickly to 
price moves as compared to other competitive moves. Their findings are well in line with 
later advocates of thoughtful competitive pricing strategies; avoid initiating an aggressive 
price move if you can attract customers with any other approach. 
2.4 Pricing Strategy 
Once the competitive price range has been identified, companies can evaluate what 
pricing strategy to pursue. Tellis (1986) defines a pricing strategy as “a set of alternative 
prices (or price schedules) that aim at profit maximization within a planning period in 
response to a given scenario.” This can be understood as how to price the product over its 
lifetime, including planned discounts, in order to maximize profits. This definition is chosen 
over the classical definition that simply splits the competitive price range into skimming 
pricing, neutral pricing and penetration pricing (e.g. Dean, 1976, Marn et al., 2003; Nagle, 
Hogan, Zale, 2016) since it includes tactics, such as discounts or bundling, for strategic use. 
In the classical definition, skimming pricing targets the segment with the highest reference 
price first and then subsequently lowers the price to capture the value of other segments with 
lower reference prices (Dean, 1976; Homburg et al., 2009). Penetration pricing targets faster 
market adoption at a lower price (Ingenbleek et al. 2013; Armstrong and Kotler, 2006). 
Neutral pricing means striking a careful balance between benefits and price in line with the 
competition (Nagle, Hogan, Zale, 2016; Jensen, 2013). This classical definition nicely 
explains what is sought at different points in the competitive price range, but has also 
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received criticism for being overly simplistic (Ingenbleek et al., 2013). For example, as stated 
before, it does not consider tactics. Several authors state that it is crucial that pricing tactics 
motivate customers to take action that benefit the seller and not only to “win the same 
business at a lower price” (Anderson et al., 2010; Nagle, Hogan, Zale, 2016; Marn et al., 
2003). For example, one common way for digital services to do this is by giving customers a 
discount for inviting a friend (e.g. Datacamp, Uber). Again, pricing is a tool that should be 
used in alignment with other tools at the company’s disposal. It is also crucial that discounts 
are planned and managed, and not applied on an ad-hoc basis as such practices could quickly 
erode profits (Nagle, Hogan, Zale, 2016) and sabotage the reference price of the service 
(Marn et al., 2003). Notably, Tellis (1986) taxonomy of pricing strategies include the 
classical market penetration and market skimming pricing strategies, and also adds other 
options. 
According to Tellis (1986), the best suitable pricing strategy appears when shared 
economies, or cross-subsidies, are observed. Tellis offers the following explanation for a 
shared economy: “In a shared economy, one consumer segment or product bears more of the 
average costs than another, but the average price still reflects cost plus acceptable profit.” 
Accordingly, pricing strategies are classified into three groups depending on which factor 
heterogeneity is present. These groups are differential pricing strategies, where consumer 
heterogeneity is utilized, competitive pricing strategies, which is based on heterogeneity in 
the competitive positions of firms, and product line pricing strategies, which utilize the 
heterogeneity in a firms related set of products. Taking into account the characteristics of 
consumers, that some have high search cost, low reservation price or special transaction 
costs; a nine-cell matrix of pricing strategies is obtained. Even if Tellis taxonomy is dated, its 
underlying fundamentals of shared economies has proven to be applicable to later pricing 
strategies such as dynamic pricing and online auctions as well (Harmon et al., 2009; Dixit et 
al., 2008). The taxonomy is normative, but the author states that real world problems are 
more complex. Hence, joint effects of shared economies may occur at the same time and lead 
a company to pursue a combination of the pricing strategies listed. The rise of IT-enabled 
solutions, however, has reduced search costs and transactions costs while enabling more 
efficient segmentation of consumer heterogeneity in willingness to pay (Dixit et al., 2008). 
As such, it makes sense to present the pricing strategies only in the three dimensions 
representing company objectives, while only keeping the consumer characteristics in mind. 
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Dixit et al. (2008) presents an updated taxonomy, including IT-enhanced pricing strategies, in 
this way. Their taxonomy can be found in Table 2. 
Table 2. A Taxonomy of Pricing Strategies (Dixit et al., 2008, based on Tellis, 1986). 
Differential Pricing Strategies Competitive Pricing Strategies Product Line Pricing Strategies 
Random Discounting 
Skimming Pricing 
Second Market Discounting 
Auctions/Reverse Auctions 
Revenue Management 
Price Signaling 
Penetration Pricing 
Automated Pricing 
Price Bundling 
Premium Pricing 
Complimentary Pricing 
Product and Price Customization 
 
While a full examination of pricing strategies is beyond the scope of the thesis, a few 
examples are in place. Gaming companies, for instance, often use random discounting for 
their in-app purchases. Random discounting is like the name suggest the act of randomly and 
infrequently discounting the price in order to capture the additional value of consumers with 
a lower reservation price and lower search costs while keeping the value of consumers with a 
higher reservation price and higher search costs (Tellis 1986). Different types of service 
bundling strategies are a prime example of the tiered pricing models, where different versions 
of a service can be sold to customer segments with different needs and willingness-to-pay 
(Deeter and Jung, 2013). While the taxonomy is by no means comprehensive, it is a useful 
indication of what methods are available and stresses the importance of planning for 
discounts as a strategic option. Product-service line pricing strategies (Dixit et al., 2008) are 
also easily implemented for digital services, since versions of the service can have features 
added or removed with relative ease and fast scalability.  
The final set of prices should be well aligned with the company strategy and objectives, 
while also considering price-volume trade-offs as well as the customers’ response (Nagle, 
Hogan, Zale, 2016). For example, Amazon.com had a company strategy that emphasized fast 
growth so that a considerable market share could be achieved and allow the company to 
become top-of-mind for consumers before any competitor could copy their business model. 
Even though the service created considerable value, a low price was motivated by these 
strategic goals that maximized expected long-term profits.  
The price-volume trade-off is well established in economic theory; marginal revenue 
should be equal to marginal cost in order to maximize profits. The problem is that these 
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numbers are usually hard to establish in reality. Hence, it has been proposed that firms use a 
more practical set of questions in order to necessarily accurately estimate the price-volume 
trade-off. For a price increase, firms should ask themselves how much volume they can 
afford to lose before the price increase becomes unprofitable, and vice versa for a price 
decrease (Nagle, Hogan, Zale, 2016). Others recommend demand estimation at several points 
in the price range and a sensitivity analysis (Dean, 1976; Marn et al., 2003). The consensus is 
that the price-volume trade-off must be taken into account by any means available in order to 
find a profit maximizing trade-off. The magnitude of these trade-offs will of course be 
dependent on the sellers margins. Digital services notably often have high margins, and hence 
often find themselves at an advantage lowering prices since less volume is needed to make up 
for the price cut (Huang, Sundararajan, 2016; Nagle, Hogan, Zale, 2016). 
The last issue to be considered is the customers’ response to the new set of prices and 
how to manage the price expectations of customers (Anderson et al., 2010; Nagle, Hogan, 
Zale, 2016). There is wide range of research available on behavioral pricing and how prices 
are perceived. While classical pricing research aims at developing normative models, 
behavioral pricing strives to explain observed behaviors with descriptive models (Thaler, 
1980). In its essence, classical pricing theory does not account for anything else besides price 
and product characteristics (Thaler, 1985), while there are a range of proven biases that have 
been shown to affect purchase behavior. Such biases are for example framing, mental 
accounting and anchoring. 
 Two key factors that are affecting consumer behavior are price expectations and 
perceived fairness (Homburg et al. 2009). Thaler (1985) demonstrates this effect through a 
survey in which the respondents are to imagine themselves lying on a beach on a hot day, 
wishing to have a cold beer in their hand. A friend gets up to make a phone call and offers to 
buy a beer on the way back. Here, the survey splits into two scenarios. In the first, the beer is 
bought from a grocery store, and in the second it is bought from a fancy beach resort hotel. 
The results from this survey where in Thaler’s own words “dramatic”. At the grocery store, 
the median price given was $1.50 while the median given at the beach resort hotel was as 
high as $2.65. Note that according to classical pricing theory atmosphere should have no 
impact on pricing, yet it does – as shown by behavioral pricing. In the case of digital services, 
there is no atmosphere to be taken into account, but the results of the survey are still 
applicable by thinking of services as if they are common or premium. In the beach example, 
the fair price of the beach resort was higher than that of the grocery store since the resort has 
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much higher costs, both for personnel and for making the hotel bar fancy enough for a beach 
resort hotel. Hence, the perceived costs affect the perceived fair price by consumers 
(Homburg et al. 2009). According to Thaler, businesses can use this principle to get higher 
prices by more clearly communicating high costs to the consumers (Thaler 1985). Anderson 
et al. (2010) put focus on the value communication strategies in order to manage customer 
expectations of a fair price, one key point being that customers should be able to verify the 
differential value with their own data when applicable. 
According to prospect theory, behavioral biases should be taken into account when 
firms set their price in relation to the expected reference price as consumers react differently 
to gains (lower price than the reference price) than to losses (higher price than the reference 
price), reacting more disproportionally negatively to losses (Kahneman, 2012). The empirical 
results for this framing effect are mixed; however, as the loss aversion effect is reduced or 
disappears when consumers are segmented on their brand loyalty (Bell and Lattin 2000; 
Krishnamurthi et al. 1992; Mazumdar and Papatla 1995). The idea might still be worth 
considering for new services as there might be limited brand loyalty established. 
Another principle affecting purchase behavior, especially when considering discounts, 
is the relative value of money (Homburg et al., 2009). Thaler (1980) demonstrates this 
through an example: Consider you are you are buying a clock radio. You find one for $25; 
however, a friend tells you that another store only 10 minutes away has the same clock for 
$20. You are now asked if you would go to the other store to get the same clock for $5 less. 
Then you are asked to consider the same situation, but now you are buying a TV for $500, 
and the other store has the same TV for $495. Would you be as willing to get the TV as the 
clock radio? For these reason, firms should evaluate promotions not only on dollar value, but 
rather on the relative price change from the original price. The same should also be true for 
the difference between real and reference prices. 
Besides the effects already mentioned, Nagle, Hogan, and Zale (2016) summarizes 
additional factors influencing price sensitivity, or sensitivity to the price-value trade-off. 
These additional effects are the shared cost effect –buyers are less price sensitive when they 
are not paying the bill themselves, the switching cost effect –buyers are less price sensitive 
the greater the added cost of switching service, the perceived risk effect – buyers are less 
price sensitive when it is difficult to compare service providers and the cost of not getting 
expected results are high, and lastly the importance of end benefit – that buyers are less price 
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sensitive when the service is a small part of the cost of a benefit with high economic or 
psychological importance. 
Summarized, firms striving to arrive at their final set of prices should ask themselves how 
much value they should try to capture with regards to the company strategy, and what the 
price-volume trade-offs would be at these alternatives. Also, they should ask themselves 
whether there are any shared economies or other circumstances that would make tactics such 
as discounting or bundling favorable for improvements of long-term total profits. Lastly, 
careful consideration should be placed on forecasting customer reactions to the price and its 
perceived fairness, and how to deal with these behavioral issues through a clear value 
communication strategy. 
Once companies have gone through each of these four stages, they should have a good 
idea of what the optimal set of prices should be. On an ending note, it must again be stressed 
that pricing is not an isolated issue. Pricing is a tool that can have a great impact on the 
profitability of firms, but it cannot be the sole source of profitability. Good pricing practices 
puts pricing in alignment with other endeavors and objectives of the company while keeping 
an open dialogue with prospects and customers. Deviations in prices should be planned for 
throughout the life cycle. 
The empirical section of the thesis will concentrate on a quantitative model of pricing. 
The conceptual framework used sees great similarities with the pricing model established in 
this theoretical section. Notably, the conceptual framework used in the empirical part starts at 
the competitive price range, and only implicitly include stages prior to that.  
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3 Methods 
This section will present the theory behind the methods utilized in this thesis. First, 
surveying as a research method will be reviewed before drilling down into construct and 
scale development. Lastly, methods of statistical analysis will be presented. 
3.1 Survey as a Research Method 
The definition here of surveys is that of self-administered quantitative surveys, which 
are defined as those were respondents answer the survey without assistance or supervision 
and without open-ended answers. Surveys are the most common method to collect primary 
data (Armstrong and Kotler, 2006). They provide a clear instrument for collecting descriptive 
information when the researcher is aware of what information is to be sought and quantified.  
There are a wide range of possible issues with surveys as a research method. Aaker et 
al. (2010) lists these possible issues depending on where in the procedure they are present. 
First, the researcher must make sure that the population has been correctly defined and that 
the sample is representative of the population (for example by controlling for non-response 
bias). Next, one must make sure that all respondents understand the questions asked correctly 
and in the same way. Even if they do, researchers must also make sure that the respondents 
have the appropriate knowledge required and remember that knowledge so that they can 
answer the questions appropriately. Further, respondents might also be tilting their response 
towards one that they find socially desirable, which introduces social response bias 
(Ingenbleek et al., 2013). A key issue is also that respondents might never had thought about 
the question being asked (Armstrong and Kotler, 2006). Lastly, the issue of response rates is 
more profound for self-administered surveys than for other methods of data collection. The 
issue is not always that adequate response rates cannot be obtained, but rather that they are 
hard to predict a priori (Aaker et al., 2010). 
Researchers utilizing self-administered surveys should consider how the prospects of 
the survey should be contacted and addressed, as this can have a major impact on the 
response rate. Researchers should also, when possible, provide an incentive and consider the 
length and general user-friendliness of the survey to get a response rate as high as possible. 
Note, however, that a high response rate does not necessarily mean that non-response bias 
cannot be present in the data. Hence, it is important for researchers to identify and understand 
possible response and non-response patterns in their data. (Aaker et al., 2010) 
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3.2 Construct and Scale Development 
The development of constructs is necessary when the variable to be observed cannot be 
observed directly. These directly unobservable variables are called latent variables 
(Borsboom et al., 2003). When these latent variables correspond to an hypothesized attribute 
assumed to be reflected in test scores, the term construct is appropriate (Cronbach and Meehl, 
1955). These have to be approximated by creating scales (a group of questions) that tackle 
the measurement issue from several angles. The questions (or items) are then typically 
summed for the creation of a multi-item measure that works as an approximation of the latent 
variable. It is widely recommended to use multi-item measures instead of single-item 
measures in order to improve the performance of the scale (e.g. Churchill, 1979). One classic 
example of a latent variable is the measurement of intelligence (which in fact is a 
combination of five different latent variables). One may use theoretical knowledge, empirical 
research, or both when hypothesizing what latent variables could be present (Suhr, 2006). 
The issue, that a set of items forming a scale should only measure just one thing in common, 
is assessed by addressing unidimensionality (Hattie, 1985). Exploratory factor analysis can be 
used for preliminary assessment, but confirmatory factor analysis provides a more rigorous 
test of undimensionality and should hence be applied as demonstrated with synthetic data by 
Gerbing and Anderson (1988). Confirmatory factor analysis has, however, more stringent 
requirements on sample size, and was therefore excluded from this thesis (Suhr, 2006).  
Even if unidimensionality is of great importance in successful scale development, it is 
not sufficient to assess only this. Reliability, or the internal consistency of the scale, is also of 
great importance. There would not be much use of a scale measure that fluctuated wildly as a 
cause of measurement error. Reliability is a measure of how stable the scale scores would be 
if they were tested again on a different sample. Reliability should, however, be assessed after 
unidimensionality has been accepted and established (Gerbing and Anderson 1988). 
Although unidimensionality and reliability has sometimes been confused and mixed 
(specifically, the most common measure of reliability has been confused with an indicator of 
dimensionality), they are two distinct issues. Gerbing and Anderson (1988) explain: “The 
dimensionality of a scale can be evaluated by examining the patterning of its component 
indicator correlations, whereas the reliability of a scale is determined by the number of items 
that define the scale and the reliabilities of those items.” Based on unidimensionality and 
reliability tests scales are then purified by dropping items scoring badly on these tests. The 
final scale should then be a good measure of the hypothesized latent variable. 
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Summarized, the identification of constructs should be rooted in theory. Several items 
measuring the same latent variable should be identified at first, before a purification 
procedure is performed in order to obtain the final scale measuring the latent variable.  
3.3 Methods of Statistical Analysis 
For preliminary assessment of unidimentionality, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) has 
been utilized, though the analysis is not indeed a true test of unidimensionality. Confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) is one method recommended for testing unidimensionality (e.g. 
Gerbing and Anderson, 1988; Furr and Bacharach, 2013), and has been performed as well. A 
very-simple-structure (VSS) analysis was also utilized assisting the determination of the 
optimal number of factors in the data. Cronbach’s alpha and Spearman-Brown have been 
used for assessing the reliability of the scales. These measures and techniques are presented 
in this section. 
3.3.1 Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Traditionally factor analysis has been utilized to explore the underlying structure of a set 
of interrelated variables without imposing any hypothesized structure on the outcome (Child, 
1990). With EFA, the number of constructs and the underlying factor structure can be 
identified (Suhr, 2006). One issue with EFA is that it might suggest more factors than what is 
theoretically justifiable, often as a cause of garbage-items that do not load on the 
hypothesized factors but do lead to an extra number of factors being identified (Churchill, 
1979). There are a number of different extraction methods and rotation options available 
from which to choose. For the purpose of this study, a minimum residuals extraction method 
was used along with a conventional orthogonal varimax rotation. The minimum residuals 
extraction method finds its advantage in producing similar solutions to the recommended 
maximum likelihood procedure even for badly behaved matrices (Personality-Project; 
Costello and Osborne, 2005). Costello and Osborne (2005) recommended the use of oblique 
rotation techniques, where factors are allowed to be correlated, since an oblique rotation will 
reproduce an orthogonal rotation but not the other way around. For this thesis, however, a 
conventional orthogonal varimax rotation was seen as a better choice since orthogonal 
rotations, where factors constrained to be uncorrelated, can improve interpretability. Note 
that rotation methods are only a transformation that improves the interpretability of the 
solution rather than improving the factor solution itself. 
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When using EFA as support for assessing unidimensionality and factor number 
identification, interpretability criteria were used along with a very-simple-structure analysis 
for the factor number identification. The interpretability criteria were the identification of 
high loadings and cross-loadings. High loadings, with loadings of at least 0.3 (Suhr, 2006) or 
0.4 (Gerbing and Anderson, 1988) were kept. Cross-loadings, with factor loadings of 0.3 on 
at least two factors were removed (Costello and Osborne, 2005). 
3.3.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is a statistical technique used to verify a theorized 
factor structure of observed variables (Suhr, 2006). As such, an a priori belief of the factor 
structure is needed, as CFA is a validation test of a hypothesized factor structure. One may 
use theoretical knowledge, empirical research, or both when determining the hypothesized a 
priori factor structure to be tested. Confirmatory factor analysis is often used in behavioral 
sciences and other areas of research where surveys are used to collect data on multi-item 
scales that measure latent constructs. The role of CFA is that it can verify that these 
constructs are truly different, and that the data fit the hypothesized model. Though 
exploratory factor analysis can be used for preliminary assessment, confirmatory factor 
analysis provide a more rigorous test of undimensionality and should hence be applied as 
demonstrated with synthetic data by Gerbing and Anderson (1988). 
To evaluate CFA model fit, several measures are used. Absolute measures used are 
the chi-square test, root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) and standardized 
root mean square residual (SRMR). The comparative fit index (CFI) has been used as a 
relative measure of model fit. Absolute measures of model fit directly examines how well the 
model fit the data, while relative measures compare the specified model to that of a null 
model, most often under the constraint that all variables are uncorrelated (McDonald and Ho, 
2002). The chi-square goodness-of-fit statistic tests the magnitude of discrepancies between 
the data and the fitted covariance matrix (Hu and Bentler, 1999). In this study a conventional 
5 % limit has been used to accept or reject the model, which means that a p-value below 0.05 
rejects the null of perfect fit and that values higher than this should be accepted. Because of 
this slightly backwards interpretation, it has sometimes been called the “badness-of-fit” test 
(Hooper et al., 2008). Chi-square tests are, however, sensitive to sample size. The RMSEA 
on the other hand is less sensitive for sample size, and is reported with confidence intervals 
making it easier to interpret with small samples (Hooper et al. 2008). Hu and Bentler (1999) 
recommended a cutoff value of the RMSEA close to 0.06 while Hooper et al. (2008) 
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recommends that the confidence interval stay in the limits of 0.00 to 0.08. The SRMR 
calculates the squared difference between the residuals of the sample covariance matrix and 
the a priori covariance model (Hooper et al. 2008). Cutoff values recommended ranges 
between 0.05 and 0.08 (Hooper et al., 2008; Hu and Bentler, 1999). The CFI is also 
comparably forgiving with regards to sample size as compared to other fit indexes (Hooper et 
al., 2008), even being reported as one of the most forgiving measures with regards to sample 
size (Fan et al., 1999). A recommended threshold for the CFI is 0.95, and values should be 
higher than this (Hu and Bentler, 1999). 
Further, one does also need to address the discriminant validity of the constructs. 
Discriminant validity is “the degree to which measures of different concepts are distinct” 
(Bagozzi and Philips, 1991). In other words, one needs to make sure that the hypothesized 
constructs are truly different. This is of particular importance in this study, as we have three 
different constructs measuring price-setting practices and we need to make sure that these are 
truly distinct. To assess the discriminant validity of the measures, the procedure 
recommended by Bagozzi and Philips (1982) and Anderson (1987) was used, specifically, the 
chi-square difference method. This method runs each CFA twice, once to constrain the 
correlation between factors to one, and once to release this constraint. The qhi-square 
difference between these models then tests whether the constructs are truly different. 
3.3.3 Very-Simple-Structure 
A very-simple-structure (VSS) analysis is used for support in determining the number of 
factors to extract. The VSS works by maximizing the VSS criterion of goodness of fit. In 
short, it lives up to its name in the sense that the method tries to find an optimal simple 
solution for the correlation matrix in an EFA in order to find the optimum number of factors 
to extract. VSS can be performed with different factoring methods and rotations. (Revelle, 
Rocklin, 1979) 
The output of a VSS analysis utilized here comes in the form of the statistic complexity. 
Complexity 1 means that all except the greatest absolute loading for an item is ignored, while 
complexity 2 means that all except the two greatest absolute loadings for an items is ignored 
and so on. The optimal factor solution is then likely to be the solution that maximizes this 
value complexity value. 
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3.3.4 Reliability Tests 
For reliability testing of the scales, Cronbach’s alpha, item-total-correlations and 
Spearman-Brown’s prophecy formula has been utilized. Cronbach’s alpha is the most widely 
used measure of reliability by marketers (Gerbing and Anderson, 1988), even if it has 
received substantial criticism (eg. Revelle and Zinbarg, 2009). It has been proposed that 
Cronbach’s alpha can be interpreted as the expected correlation between two tests measuring 
the same construct (Nunnally, 1978). Many professionals hold an alpha of 0.7 as a threshold 
for reliability, but an acceptable threshold is ultimately dependent on the use case of the data. 
Schmitt show that alphas even as low as 0.5 do not substantially weaken validity coefficients 
(Schmitt, 1996). Churchill (1979) cites Nunnally (1967), stating that alphas in the range 0.5 – 
0.6 may be sufficient for early stages of research, while it is probably unnecessary to try to 
increase alpha over 0.8. In the case of a two-item scale, however, Cronbach’s alpha is 
effectively the lower bound of reliability, and will hence underestimate the true reliability in 
most cases (Eisinga, Grotenhuis and Pelzer, 2013). Even if two scale items are not 
recommended, sometimes circumstances require researchers to estimate reliability of two-
item scales. In this situation, Eisinga et al. (2013) recommends the use of Spearman-Brown 
instead of Cronbach’s alpha as they show that the coefficient bias in on average larger for 
Cronbach’s alpha than for Spearman-Brown on two-item scales. The Spearman-Brown 
formula calculates an aggregate measure of the proportion of every single items variance 
explained by the true score to the proportion unexplained. The Spearman-Brown coefficient 
for reliability is interpreted in the same way as Cronbach’s alpha. Item-total correlations, on 
the other hand, have long been advocated for by e.g. Nunnally (1978) and Kline (1983). The 
basic idea is to correlate the item scores with the total score of the scale (Gerbing and 
Anderson, 1988). Again, different thresholds are advocated for depending on the purpose of 
the study. Churchill (1979) only states that item-total correlations near zero should be deleted 
as well as items that cause sudden drops in item-total correlations. 
  
 Survey Design 
 
 33  
 
4 Survey Design 
The survey was framed to be answered based on the latest service introduced to the 
market that had been on the market for at least 12 months, to get valid measures of market 
performance. Respondents were stimulated to participate by ensuring anonymity and by 
offering the results as well as a summary of the pricing literature as a reward for 
participation. 
This part will step-by-step cover how the survey was designed and carried out. First, the 
conceptual framework utilized and construct development will be presented, followed by a 
walkthrough of the scale development. Lastly, the data collection procedure is presented. 
4.1 Construct Development  
The conceptual framework utilized for the construct, and accordingly scale, 
development is that presented in Ingenbleek et al. (2013). It draws on Monroe’s pricing 
discretion model (2003), consumer price perception literature and numerical cognition 
literature. It also holds striking similarities to that presented in the theoretical section of this 
thesis. The price-setting practices in the conceptual framework of Ingenbleek et al (2013) can 
be closely linked to the decision where in the competitive price range a firm should place its 
final set of prices. The relative service advantage can be linked to the differential value 
measure of the pricing model presented in the theoretical section of this thesis. Relative cost 
and competitive intensity are both important aspects of the pricing model as well. Two key 
distinctions, however, are the pricing models focus on the final set of prices, rather than 
targeting of the competitive price range as in the conceptual framework by Ingenbleek et al. 
(2013). This difference could possibly be attributable to the distinction between the classical 
definition of pricing strategy (penetration vs skimming pricing) and the more complex 
definition by Tellis (1986) utilized in the pricing model. The other difference lies in the 
outcome variables. While the pricing model emphasizes total discounted lifetime profits, the 
conceptual framework by Ingenbleek et al. (2013) presents two distinct outcome variables 
representing pricing power, in the form of relative price, and market performance as 
compared to stated objectives. An illustration of the conceptual framework is found in figure 
5. 
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 As managers aim to set prices for a new service, they start with no information. 
Therefore, they aim to collect information about quantifiable variables. As stated by 
Ingenbleek et al. (2013) customer value, competition and costs are the only variables that can 
be usefully quantifiable from scratch. This view is also supported by range of other authors 
(e.g. Dean, 1976; Nagle, Hogan, Zale, 2016; Anderson et al., 2010; Marn et al., 2003). The 
practices for establishing estimates of customer value, competitor’s prices and costs are 
labeled price-setting practices (not to be confused with pricing practices as in Monroe 1993). 
It is proposed that the use of different price-setting practices will impact market performance 
and pricing power (the relative price charged as compared to the competition) differently 
under certain conditions (Diamantopoulos, 1991). These conditions are the level of service 
advantage over or below the competition, the relative cost of the service as compared to the 
competition, and the level of competitive intensity in the market. These moderating variables 
all find support in the new product performance literature.  
Relative service advantage is seen as one of the strongest predictors of market 
performance (Henard and Szymanski, 2001) and also connects to the price ceiling of 
Monroe’s price discretion model (Monroe, 2003), as relative service advantage refers to the 
relative superiority of the service over the competition (Gatignon and Xuereb, 1997; 
Ingenbleek et al., 2013). Interestingly, Ingenbleek et al. (2013) found that practicing the 
wrong price-setting practices could erode this effect. Competitive intensity refers to the 
degree to which competitors are active in the market and actively driving change (Atuahene-
Gima, 1995) and is expected to have a negative effect on market performance. This is 
because competitive advantage tends to erode in highly competitive markets (Achrol, 1991; 
Figure 5. Conceptual Framework (Ingenbleek et al. 2013) 
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Homburg and Pflesser, 2000), even if a paper by Dawar (2013) suggest that this might not 
always be the case. Further, in the same way we connected relative service advantage to the 
price ceiling, we connect the price floor to the relative cost, which refer to the direct and 
indirect costs of taking a service to the market and keeping it there (Gatignon and Xuereb, 
1997; Marn et al. 2003). The construct measuring market performance captures the 
achievements of a newly introduced service relative to its pre-stated objectives (Atuahene-
Gima, 1995) while the relative price captures the pricing power a company holds relative to 
its competition.  
The information needed to quantify customer value, competitor’s prices and costs is 
often incomplete or imprecise, which forces managers to act on estimates. The greater the 
uncertainty regarding the numerical estimates or how they interact in the pricing 
environment, the more the pricing decision makers must prepare for alternative sources of 
information and look for alternative ways of determining the estimates (Pich, Loch, De 
Meyer 2002). See definitions of the price-setting practices in table 3. 
 
These price-setting practices represent the first three constructs, and the logic behind 
them find support among other authors as well (e.g. Marn et al., 2003; Nagle, Hogan, and 
Zale, 2016). Ingenbleek et al. points out that studies have also previously considered 
customer value, competition and costs, but that they have done so in the form of pricing 
methods. Pricing methods are mutually exclusive methods to make a pricing decision (e.g. 
Piercy 1981; Udell 1972; Zeithaml, Parasuraman, and Berry 1985). Here, as well as in 
Ingenbleek et al. (2003, 2013) the focus is on price-setting practices, by which the 
conceptualization state that managers make pricing decisions based on assessments of 
multiple types of information and combinations of these different information types. Since 
these constructs can all be viewed as price-setting practices, it is important that we can 
Table 3. Definitions of Price-setting Practices (adapted from Inbenbleek et al. 2003) 
 
Definition 
Value-informed 
Pricing 
Setting prices based on information on customers’ perception of the benefits that the 
service offers and that they trade off against the price. 
 
Competition-
informed Pricing 
The price-setting practice of setting prices based on competitors’ prices relative to their 
market positions.    
 
Cost-informed 
Pricing 
Setting prices based on information on fixed, variable, direct and indirect costs for 
developing, maintaining and marketing the new service. 
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distinguish them from each other and provide evidence that they truly are different. The 
price-setting practices should, however, be seen as a matter of degree and not as mutually 
exclusive categories (Ingenbleek et al., 2003). As such, managers should, according to the 
conceptual model, put different weights on the price-suggestions set by the different price-
setting practices when determining the final price. The outcome variables measuring the 
success of these price-setting practices are a construct on market performance and a single 
item construct on relative price. As stated in Ingenbleek et al. (2013), the pricing discretion 
model is consistent with game theoretical studies as well as other pricing literature 
(Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003; Winer, 2006; Nagle, Hogan 
and Zale, 2016). 
4.2 Scale and Item Development 
All scales in this thesis are based on those used in Ingenbleek et al. (2013). These in turn, 
are all based on existing scales that have been tested before their study. All items were 
measured on a 1-5 likert scale. The scales and items for the price-setting practices measures 
are based on Ingenbleek et al.’s 2003 paper. The original items for these scales are as 
follows: 
“To what degree were the following factors included in the price-setting process of the 
new service? In other words, to what extent did you take into account the following 
elements while determining the price of the new product/service? (1 = was not important 
at all in price setting, 5 = played a major role in price setting)” 
 
Value-informed pricing 
X3. The advantages the new service offers to the customer 
X4. The balance between advantages of the service and the possible price (price-quality 
comparison) 
X5. The advantages of the product/service offers, as compared with competitors’ 
services 
Competition-informed pricing 
X6. The price of competitors’ services 
X7. The degree of competition on the market 
X8. The competitors’ current price strategy 
X9. The market structure (number and strength of competitors) 
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Cost-informed pricing 
X10. The share of fixed costs in the cost price 
X11. The cost price of the service 
 
For digital services, however, there was a need to develop completely new items for the 
cost-informed pricing construct as digital services inevitably have a different cost structure as 
opposed to products and normal labor-intensive services. Digital services typically have zero 
or almost zero variable cost, given a fixed amount of infrastructure (Huang and Sundararajan 
2011). As a result of this digital services typically have an exceptionally large proportion of 
fixed costs such as those related to research and development. This makes cost-informed 
pricing more complicated for digital services companies since the cost per unit is more 
dependent on accurate estimates of volume than for their manufacturing or labor-intensive 
service counterparts (Ingenbleek et al. 2003). In order to build a reliable measure for cost-
informed pricing applicable to digital services, one needs to include items crucial for 
determining the cost price for digital services. One metric that capture both the full cost and 
indirectly the volume estimates is target return on investment. Another metric that is well 
applicable for cost-informed pricing in digital services is the price necessary for break-even, 
since this effectively identifies the price-floor. Further, even if digital services are often 
modeled as information goods with zero marginal cost, Huang and Sundararajan show that 
the commonly used full cost recovery method is often suboptimal, and that firms should 
model capacity increases as semi-fixed costs (Huang and Sundararajan, 2011). Accordingly, 
an item related to projections of future capacity increases was included. Also, instead of 
using the term cost price, it was decided to go with total cost instead as this terminology is 
clearer for professionals not familiar with accounting terms. Finalized, the new items for 
cost-informed pricing for the case of digital services were as follows: 
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“To what degree were the following factors included in the price-setting process of the 
new service? In other words, to what extent did you take into account the following 
elements while determining the price of the new product/service? (1 = was not important 
at all in price setting, 5 = played a major role in price setting)” 
Cost-informed pricing 
X10. Target return on investment 
X11. The price necessary for break-even 
X12. The total cost of the service 
X13. Costs of future capacity increases 
The scale for service advantage was originally (in Ingenbleek et al. 2013) adapted from 
Gatignon and Xuereb (1997). The relative service advantage construct is meant to capture 
“various sources of competitive advantages in terms of attributes, benefits and image” 
(Gatignon and Xuereb, 1997). In the final scale, there were items regarding service quality, 
the ability to express trustworthiness and expertise, reliability and one item regarding the 
overall advantage of the service. This scale is exactly the same used in Ingenbleek et al. 
(2013). 
“How do you estimate the relative advantages of this product/service as compared with 
competitors’ products services for… (1 = no relative advantage, 5 = very high 
advantage)” 
Relative Service Advantage 
X14. Service quality 
X15. Expressing trustworthiness and expertise 
X16. Reliability of the service 
X17. Overall advantage of the service 
Gatignon and Xuereb (1997) also developed the scale for relative service cost that 
Ingenbleek et al. (2013) adopted for their study. There was a need to modify the scale in this 
study as well in order for the items to comply with the cost structure and certain elements of 
digital services. Accordingly, the item on manufacturing or operations cost was excluded in 
favor for an item on the cost of relative capacity increases based on Huang’s and 
Sundararajan’s (2011) research on semi-fixed cost in digital services. The other items cover 
marketing costs, research and development costs and total costs. Below is the original scale 
as well as the scale updated for digital services. 
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“How do you estimate the relative costs of this service as compared with competitors’ 
services, for… (1 = very low relative costs, 5 = very high relative costs)” 
Relative Costs (original scale) 
X18. Marketing costs 
X19. Manufacturing / operations costs 
X20. Research and development costs 
X21. Total costs 
Relative Costs (for digital services) 
X18. Marketing costs 
X19. Research and development costs 
X20. Total costs 
X21. Cost of capacity increases 
For the scale measuring competitive intensity, a choice was made to keep with 
Ingenbleek et al.’s (2013) focus on changes made by competitors that are likely to affect 
pricing decisions. These changes are changes in the services, changes in sales strategies and 
changes in promotion and advertising strategies and they were measured by asking 
respondents to rate the degree to which these occur in the market were the new service was 
launched. 
“Rate the extent to which the following changes occur in the market on which you 
launched the service…  1 = little to no extent, 5 = to a very high extent” 
Competitive Intensity 
X22. Changes in services offered by your competitors  
X23. Changes in sales strategies by your competitors 
X24. Changes in sales promotion / advertising strategies by your competitors 
Homburg and Pflesser (2000) presented a six-item scale for market performance which 
was adopted into a five-item scale by Ingenbleek et al. (2013). In this study, Ingenbleek’s 
version was kept without changes. Differences between Homburg and Pflesser’s (2000) scale 
and the one used in this study and by Ingenbleek et al. (2013) are a shift in focus from 
customer value to competitive advantage, so the item is less likely to load on the relative 
service advantage or value-informed pricing constructs. Items related to company-wide 
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objectives were also removed as well, as the objectives in a pricing context should be service-
specific. 
“Rate the extent to which the service has achieved the following outcomes (compared 
with their predetermined or expected objectives) during the first 12 months after launch 
of the service… 5= was completely reached, 1 = was not reached at all)” 
Market Performance 
X25. The degree to which the product satisfies a customer want or need as compared 
with the objective or expectation 
X26. Sales to current customers as compared with the objective or expectation 
X27. Sales to new customers as compared with the objective or expectation 
X28. Market share as compared with the objective or expectation 
X29. Degree to which the product offers a competitive advantage as compared with the 
objective or expectation 
The measurement of relative price consists of a single item asking respondents to 
indicate the relative price of their offering compared to their competition, and is used as an 
estimate of pricing power. The single item measure in Ingenbleek et al. (2013) was adapted 
from Chen and MacMillan (1992) as well as Noble and Gruca (1999).  
Relative Price 
X30. Please indicate the relative price of your product 
1. – 5 % or less than the market 
2. – 2 % to – 5 % less than the market 
3. + / - 2 % around the market 
4. + 2 % to + 5 % more than the market 
5. + 5 % or more than the market 
The scale scores were obtained conventionally by summing the item scores (Gerbing and 
Anderson, 1988). All scale-items can be found in appendix A. Three background questions 
were also added to the survey. One asking respondents to state their position at the company 
(open text question), one to state the company size in number of employees ( < 50, 51 – 100, 
101 – 500, > 500), and one to state what type of market their company is operating in (B2B, 
B2C, Hybrid). 
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4.3 Survey Testing 
Since there was a lack of willing respondents, no quantitative survey testing was 
conducted. Given the fact that all scales had been tested before (except for the items 
measuring cost-informed pricing), a decision was made that qualitative survey testing would 
be enough. In the qualitative survey testing, emphasis was put on how clearly the questions 
were communicated, and therefore how easily understandable they were. First, an informal 
meeting was set up with non-respondents so that they could comment on how easily 
understandable the questions were. No changes were made after this meeting. Second, two 
respondents answered the survey. These respondents gave immediate feedback by phone 
while answering the survey. As a result of this early feedback, the item for marketing costs in 
the relative cost scale was expanded to include customer acquisition costs. 
“How do you estimate the relative costs of this service as compared with competitors’ 
services, for… (1 = very low relative costs, 5 = very high relative costs)” 
Relative Costs 
X18. Marketing costs, including customer acquisition costs 
X19. Research and development costs 
X20. Total costs 
X21. Cost of capacity increases 
The single-item scale for relative price was also expanded to make the question clearer 
and offer as little room for subjective interpretation as possible. Included in the question was 
now industry-jargon from the gaming industry, which has a very different pricing structure as 
compared to other digital services. The new single-item scale for relative price was: 
X30. Please indicate your average unique purchase value, or price, relative to your 
market. 
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5 Propositions 
Since the sample size is small in this study, analysis is conducted in an exploratory 
manner. Hence, this study takes some liberty interpreting outputs in order to find possible 
effects with support in the literature, rather than hard hypotheses testing. Still, there are a few 
propositions that we want to check. 
First, I agree with Ingenbleek et al. (2013) that there should be an unconditional positive 
effect of value-informed pricing on market performance. The practice of value-informed 
pricing has long been advocated for (e.g. Monroe, 2003; Nagle, Hogan, and Zale, 2016) with 
the motivation that value-informed pricing leads to better possibility of creating a positive 
trade-off between quality and price for the customers. 
 P1: More use of value-informed pricing leads to higher market performance. 
Next, as relative service cost decreases, there should be a positive effect of cost-informed 
pricing on market performance. The motivation here is that, as relative cost decreases, an 
opportunity for penetration pricing opens up for the company. This is stated as a condition for 
penetration pricing by Dean (1976) among others. 
P2: As relative cost decreases, there is a positive effect of cost-informed pricing on 
market performance. 
For the third proposition, I agree with Ingenbleek at al. (2013) that a higher relative 
service advantage should lead to an increase in the positive impact of value-informed pricing. 
Earlier papers have stated that prices of high-quality products and services are higher in order 
to cover costs and create an incentive to create quality (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Rao and 
Monroe, 1996).  
P3: With higher relative service advantage, the positive impact of value-informed 
pricing on relative price increases. 
The logic behind the fourth proposition is simple. By putting too much weight on cost-
informed price-setting practices, too much weight is put towards the price floor. This effect is 
more pronounced when relative service advantage is high. This effect was tested and proven 
by Ingenbleek et al. (2013).  
P4: With higher relative service advantage, the negative impact of cost-informed 
pricing on relative price increases. 
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Lastly, Monroe (2003) states that competitive intensity can shrink the competitive price range 
from the ceiling. Competitive intensity is also expected to have a negative effect on market 
performance as competitive advantage is expected to erode more quickly in highly 
competitive markets (Achrol, 1991; Homburg and Pflesser, 2000). Accordingly, we have our 
fifth and sixth proposition: 
P5: Competitive intensity has a negative effect on relative price. 
P6: Competitive intensity has a negative effect on market performance. 
With these six propositions stated, the results are presented in the next section. There 
were other hypothesis stated, and proved, by Ingenbleek et al. (2013) that would have been 
interesting to explore. Unfortunately, with a sample size this small, no three-way effects can 
reasonably be included in the analysis. 
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6 Results 
First, an initial list of 106 digital service providers based in Finland was collected. The 
list included company name, website and contact information. The list of companies was 
gathered manually by browsing sites consolidating companies in the digital services industry 
(such as e.g. startup100.net). Thereafter, contact information was collected from the 
companies’ websites. As the person responding to the survey had to have knowledge of the 
company strategy as well as the pricing process, only people in suitable positions were 
selected (such as CEO’s, CFO’s and CMO’s). After revising the list based on which 
companies had had a service on the market for at least 12 months, 78 companies remained. 
After contacting all companies by phone and e-mail, 20 responses were received for a 
response rate of 26 %. Even if this sample is too small to make any sufficient statistical 
analysis, a decision was made to carry on with the research as a preliminary study. The 
decision was made because of time-constraints, as it had proven to be an extremely time-
consuming activity to collect both list information as well as survey data. 
6.1 Description of Sample 
Of the respondents, 14 reported to be operating in a B2B market (70 %), 1 reported to be 
operating in a B2C market (5 %), and 5 reported to be operating in a hybrid market (25 %). In 
the sample, 19 companies had less than 50 employees while one company had 100-150 
employees. The survey was filled out by 10 CEO’s (50 %), 6 founders, owners or co-
founders (30 %), one Finance Director, one Chief Marketing Officer, one Managing Director, 
and one Chief Operating Officer (5 % each).  
Non-response bias was checked for by subjecting all variables to ANOVA tests 
comparing respondents divided into early, intermediate and late respondents as well as a two-
part division into early and late respondents. None of the tests were significant, which 
indicates that non-response bias is likely not a problem in the data. Some reservation to the 
tests is still in place as the small sample size would crave large differences in order for the 
tests to be significant. Common method bias was also tested for by subjecting all measures to 
a Harman’s one-factor test. The results showed that the unrotated one-factor solution only 
accounted for 21 % of the variance, indicating that common method bias probably is not an 
issue. 
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6.2 Construct Validity and Scale Reliability 
First, a very-simple-structure (VSS) analysis was conducted in order to check the most 
probable number of factors found in the data in an exploratory manner, to check if this 
number was consistent with the proposed number of factors. For the VSS, the minimum 
residuals factoring method was used with a varimax rotation, the same used for the 
exploratory factor analysis. The VSS analysis concluded that the complexity 1 peak show 
twelve factors, but that it is probably more reasonable to think about the proposed number of 
seven factors as the complexity flattens out at that number of factors with only marginal 
bump in improvement by adding more factors. There is also a noticeable downwards bump at 
the eight-factor solution for complexity 2 and complexity 3. This effect is illustrated in figure 
6. 
 
Next, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted in order to identify how well 
the items loaded on the proposed number of factors. The items loaded generally well on the 
proposed seven factors, and there was no indication that there was a better solution available 
with fewer or more factor solutions. Following, the EFA factor loadings with all items 
included. 
Figure 6. VSS Analysis Graphical Output 
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Table 4. EFA Factor-Loadings, All Items Included. 
 
Value-
informed 
pricing 
Competition-
informed 
pricing 
Cost-
informed 
pricing 
Relative 
service 
advantage 
Relative 
cost 
Competitive 
intensity 
Market 
performance 
X3 0,31 -0,33 -0,21 0,44 0,20 0,21 0,34 
X4 0,86 0,02 0,10 0,03 0,17 0,08 0,09 
X5 -0,17 0,07 -0,01 0,81 0,23 -0,14 -0,12 
X6 0,07 0,81 -0,16 0,12 -0,03 -0,16 -0,17 
X7 0,33 0,25 0,31 0,37 -0,31 -0,28 0,04 
X8 0,03 0,95 -0,01 0,11 0,04 -0,04 -0,08 
X9 0,45 0,57 0,32 -0,45 -0,09 0,13 0,27 
X10 0,48 -0,12 0,46 0,57 0,14 -0,14 -0,07 
X11 0,06 0,00 0,82 -0,18 -0,14 -0,05 -0,06 
X12 -0,07 0,35 0,55 -0,18 0,58 0,16 -0,12 
X13 0,09 -0,20 0,88 0,03 0,12 0,05 0,16 
X14 -0,52 -0,30 0,27 0,40 0,00 -0,11 0,28 
X15 -0,21 0,12 0,57 0,46 0,22 0,16 0,33 
X16 -0,03 0,26 0,07 0,12 -0,11 0,60 0,42 
X17 0,09 0,19 -0,23 0,79 -0,22 0,19 0,16 
X18 0,11 -0,55 0,01 0,52 0,50 0,25 0,04 
X19 -0,36 0,04 -0,21 0,37 0,52 0,33 -0,33 
X20 0,12 -0,05 0,08 0,19 0,91 0,01 0,02 
X21 0,07 -0,04 0,01 0,00 0,93 -0,05 -0,05 
X22 0,13 0,05 -0,11 -0,02 -0,19 0,84 -0,16 
X23 -0,10 -0,27 0,01 -0,01 0,11 0,88 -0,07 
X24 0,11 -0,17 0,12 -0,02 0,24 0,84 -0,05 
X25 -0,04 -0,20 0,00 0,02 0,11 -0,24 0,85 
X26 0,42 0,07 -0,05 0,23 -0,33 0,09 0,57 
X27 -0,05 0,19 0,23 0,28 -0,46 0,08 0,63 
X28 0,15 -0,30 0,19 -0,01 -0,04 0,22 0,75 
X29 -0,07 0,01 -0,11 -0,31 0,00 -0,43 0,74 
 
The first item of the value-informed pricing construct (X3), related to the advantages the 
service offer the customer, showed weak results, loading more strongly on relative service 
advantage. The third item on value-informed pricing (X5) loaded slightly negatively on the 
factor that the other value-informed pricing (V) items loaded positively on, and loaded 
instead highly on the same factor as the relative service advantage items. The item was 
related to the importance of the advantages of the service as compared to competitor’s 
services.  
Item X7 from competition-informed pricing also showed weak results, as it loaded 
weakly on several factors. Item X9 also loaded on both value-informed pricing as well as 
cost-informed pricing. The items were related to the degree of competition in the market (X7) 
and the number and strength of competitors (X9). 
From the cost-informed pricing construct, items X10 and X12 loaded on several factors. 
The items were related to target return on investment (X10) and total cost (X12). From 
relative service advantage, all items but X17 loaded badly on other factors. 
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The items X18 and X19 from the relative cost construct also loaded on relative service 
advantage. The items were related to marketing costs (X18) and research and development 
costs (X19). 
All items for competitive intensity loaded well on one factor while X26 and X27 from 
market performance loaded slightly on other factors as well. The items were related to sales 
to current (X26) and new (X27) customers. 
Next, the data was split in two, one part to cover dimensions of price-setting practices and 
one two cover other constructs. This was done in order to more clearly identify hidden 
structures of items, especially unwanted loadings, by reducing the number of factors to be 
identified. Below, the factor loadings of all items for price-setting practices are presented. 
Table 5. EFA Factor-Loadings of Items Related to Price-Setting Practices. 
 
Value-informed 
pricing 
Competition-
informed pricing 
Cost-informed 
pricing 
X3 0,30 -0,21 -0,08 
X4 -0,05 0,00 0,30 
X5 0,88 0,26 -0,16 
X6 -0,02 0,81 -0,20 
X7 0,17 0,36 0,33 
X8 -0,13 0,98 0,10 
X9 -0,58 0,40 0,55 
X10 0,56 -0,06 0,40 
X11 -0,15 -0,01 0,73 
X12 -0,07 0,33 0,57 
X13 0,16 -0,15 0,87 
 
Based on this, it might be tempting to base the value-informed pricing scale on item X5, 
related to advantage over competitors’ offerings. Remember, however, that X5 was the item 
that showed weak loading on value-informed pricing when all items were included, and 
instead loaded highly on relative service advantage. The item (X5) also showed itself to be 
badly correlated with the other two items. Hence, it was decided that X5 was the item to drop 
from the analysis. For the other price-setting practices, the decision was more 
straightforward. Items X6, X8, X11 and X13 were kept in the analysis. The factor loadings 
for items related to price-setting practices remaining after the purification can be found in 
table 6. 
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Table 6. Purified EFA Factor-Loadings Related to Price-Setting Practices. 
 
Value-informed 
pricing 
Competition-
informed pricing 
Cost-informed 
pricing 
X3 0,56 -0,23 -0,15 
X4 0,64 0,11 0,14 
X6 0,03 0,98 -0,18 
X8 -0,10 0,81 0,07 
X11 -0,05 0,07 0,70 
X13 0,09 -0,19 0,95 
 
The same procedure was performed for the rest of the constructs. The factor loadings for 
the rest of the constructs with all items included are found in table 7. 
Table 7. Factor loadings not related to price-setting practices. 
 
Relative service 
advantage Relative cost 
Competitive 
intensity 
Market 
performance 
X14 0,09 0,06 -0,11 0,35 
X15 0,61 0,27 0,12 0,2 
X16 0,7 -0,07 0,34 -0,01 
X17 0,68 -0,03 0,01 -0,04 
X18 0,09 0,57 0,19 0,05 
X19 0,13 0,43 0,24 -0,44 
X20 0 0,98 -0,05 0 
X21 -0,25 0,9 -0,05 -0,05 
X22 0,16 -0,2 0,78 -0,25 
X23 0,12 0,14 0,87 -0,15 
X24 0,11 0,25 0,9 -0,04 
X25 0,02 0,09 -0,23 0,82 
X26 0,32 -0,16 -0,03 0,49 
X27 0,63 -0,27 0,05 0,42 
X28 0,12 0,05 0,38 0,87 
X29 -0,1 -0,12 -0,36 0,64 
 
Based on this, the items X14, X18, X19, X26 and X27 were be removed as these show 
weak loadings, loaded on the wrong factor, cross-loaded or all of these. Running the EFA on 
the full set of constructs, is was noticed that the item X15 loaded highly on cost-informed 
pricing. Hence, also X15 was removed. X16 was kept even if it cross-loaded slightly in order 
to keep a minimum of two items per scale. Following are the loadings of the purified non-
price-setting practice constructs. 
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Table 8. Factor Loadings of Final Item Structure. 
 
Value-
informed 
pricing 
Competition-
informed 
pricing 
Cost-
informed 
pricing 
Relative 
service 
advantage Relative cost 
Competitive 
intensity 
Market 
performance 
X3 0,31 -0,21 -0,18 0 0,2 0,22 0,29 
X4 0,98 0,07 0,1 0,04 0,1 0,03 0,04 
X6 0,09 0,8 -0,2 0,08 -0,08 -0,21 -0,15 
X8 -0,05 0,97 0,07 0,18 0,01 0,04 -0,1 
X11 0,03 0,08 0,75 -0,29 -0,18 0,09 0 
X13 0,06 -0,18 0,96 0,13 0,12 0,07 0,07 
X16 0,02 0,11 0,18 0,64 -0,12 0,4 0,08 
X17 0,03 0,14 -0,25 0,5 -0,07 0,05 -0,02 
X20 0,13 -0,09 0,02 0,09 0,98 -0,04 -0,03 
X21 0,03 0,03 -0,06 -0,3 0,95 0,05 0,05 
X22 0,09 0,14 -0,03 0,09 -0,24 0,87 -0,14 
X23 -0,11 -0,22 0,04 0,08 0,11 0,95 -0,12 
X24 0,17 -0,17 0,19 0,19 0,18 0,78 -0,13 
X25 0 -0,21 0,03 0,11 0,08 -0,27 0,83 
X28 0,25 -0,33 0,19 0,22 -0,03 0,23 0,66 
X29 -0,04 0,1 -0,03 -0,19 -0,07 -0,26 0,83 
 
In this final solution, we still see some loadings that do not look too good, especially in 
the value-informed pricing (X3) and relative service advantage (X16) constructs. No further 
changes were done, as this would have caused some measures to collapse into a single-item 
scale, which is undesirable. 
To assess unidimensionality, a series of two factor CFA models was used in order to 
come as close as possible to the 5 to 1 rule of sample size to parameter estimates in CFA 
(Kline 1998). This resulted in 21 combinations of two-factor CFA models to be analyzed. 
Very few items showed no signs of unidimensionality issues. In fact, the only scale that did 
passed the stringent CFA test of unidimensionality on all occasions was the scale for 
competitive intensity. There were also issues with non-converging models, probably also a 
cause of the small sample size. Generally, most models showed that the data fit the proposed 
model well. The results of the pairwise confirmatory factor analyses are summarized in table 
8. A star (*) marks values below their thresholds for RMSEA and SRMR while it indicates a 
value larger than the threshold for the chi-square test and CFI. Non-converging models show 
no values. 
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Table 9. Two-factor CFA results.         
CFA model p-value CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Value-informed pricing & competition informed pricing - - - - 
Value-informed pricing & cost-informed pricing - - - - 
Value-informed pricing & relative service advantage 0.74* 1.00* 0.00* 0.02* 
Value-informed pricing & relative cost 0.37* 1.00* 0.00* 0.04* 
Value-informed pricing & competitive intensity - - - - 
Value-informed pricing & market performance - - - - 
Competition informed pricing & cost-informed pricing 0.52* 1.00* 0.00* 0.04* 
Competition informed pricing & relative service advantage 0.55* 1.00* 0.00* 0.03* 
Competition informed pricing & relative cost 0.79* 1.00* 0.00* 0.01* 
Competition informed pricing & competitive intensity 0.09* 0.94 0.22 0.10 
Competition informed pricing & market performance 0.28* 0.97* 0.11 0.11 
Cost-informed pricing & relative service advantage - - - - 
Cost-informed pricing & relative cost - - - - 
Cost-informed pricing & competitive intensity 0.01 0.82 0.36 0.06* 
Cost-informed pricing & market performance - - - - 
Relative service advantage & relative cost 0.94* 1.00* 0.00* 0.01* 
Relative service advantage & competitive intensity 0.77* 1.00* 0.00* 0.04* 
Relative service advantage & market performance - - - - 
Relative cost & competitive intensity 0.05 0.92 0.27 0.10 
Relative cost & market performance 0.14* 0.95* 0.19 0.06* 
Competitive intensity & market performance 0.02 0.86 0.25 0.15 
 
Of the converging models, just two indicate bad fit of data to the models on all indicators. 
These are the two-factor combinations of relative cost and competitive intensity and 
competitive intensity and market performance. Other combinations showing weak results 
were competition-informed pricing and competitive intensity as well as cost-informed pricing 
and competitive intensity. Notably, the measure for competitive intensity is present in all of 
these combinations and hence we can assume unidimensionality issues with this measure. 
To assess reliability, Cronbach’s alpha and item-total correlations were used. These 
supported the removal of, items X5 (item-total correlation: 0.02), X7 (item-total correlation: 
0.30), X10 (item-total correlation: 0.35), and X14 (item-total correlation: 0.23). Removing 
these items resulted in a lift in the Cronbach alpha of the scales. The Cronbach alphas and 
other properties of the purified measures can be found in table 10. 
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Table 10. Properties of Purified Measures 
      
  Items Mean SD Alpha S-B 
Value-informed pricing 2 4.15 0.81 0.46 0.63 
Competition-informed pricing 2 3.50 1.03 0.87   
Cost-informed pricing 2 2.38 1.05 0.75   
Relative service advantage 2 4.05 0.71 0.50 0.67 
Relative cost 2 2.43 1.04 0.94   
Competitive intensity 3 2.57 1.02 0.90   
Market Performance 3 3.55 0.83 0.80   
Relative Price 1 3.30 1.42     
 
As can be seen in table 9, most alphas reach a satisfactory level of 0.6, except for those of 
value-informed pricing and relative service advantage. These are, however, both two-item 
scales which makes the use of Cronbach’s alpha problematic since it will underestimate the 
reliability (Eisinga, Grotenhuis, and Pelzer 2013). Cronbach’s alpha is essentially the lower 
bound for the true reliability. Using Spearman-Brown with a factor of two (adding two more 
questions following the same characteristics), we get a new reliability for value-informed 
pricing of 0.6 and a reliability of 0.67 for relative service advantage. Eisinga et al. (2013) 
showed that the bias given by the Spearman-Brown coefficient is indeed smaller on average 
than that of Cronbach’s alpha, on average. The Spearman-Brown coefficient is interpreted in 
the same way as Cronbach’s alpha. Given the small sample, the reliabilities of this test seem 
decent, as they are in the range of 0.6 and upwards with most reliabilities bordering 0.7 or 
higher. The correlation matrix of the purified measures can be found in table 11. 
 
Table 11. Correlation Matrix of Purified Measures 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Value-informed pricing 1.00               
2 Competition-informed pricing -0.08 1.00             
3 Cost-informed pricing 0.01 -0.09 1.00           
4 Relative service advantage 0.19 0.18 0.01 1.00         
5 Relative cost 0.25 -0.07 -0.07 -0.19 1.00       
6 Competitive intensity 0.14 -0.13 0.12 0.36 0.02 1.00     
7 Market Performance 0.22 -0.28 0.07 0.01 0.01 -0.19 1.00   
8 Relative Price 0.12 -0.2 -0.29 -0.09 0.5 0.31 -0.27 1.00 
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To assess the discriminant validity of the measures, the procedure recommended by 
Bagozzi and Philips (1982) and Anderson (1987) was used. Specifically, the chi-square 
difference method. This method runs each CFA twice, once to constrain the correlation 
between factors to one, and once to release this constraint. The qhi-square difference between 
these models then tests whether the constructs are truly different. Once again, the lack of data 
showed itself problematic since two more of the constrained models did not converge. This 
means that it was not possible to test the discriminant validity of nine pairs of measures.  
The models that did converge, however, show good results with every pair of constructs 
showing significant discriminant validity on a 5 % level. The results of the chi-square 
difference tests are shown in table 10. 
Table 12. Chi-square Difference Results     
CFA model p-value Chi-sq Diff. 
Value-informed pricing & competition informed pricing - - 
Value-informed pricing & cost-informed pricing - - 
Value-informed pricing & relative service advantage < 0.01 8.03 
Value-informed pricing & relative cost 0.01 6.30 
Value-informed pricing & competitive intensity - - 
Value-informed pricing & market performance - - 
Competition informed pricing & cost-informed pricing - - 
Competition informed pricing & relative service advantage < 0.01 8.21 
Competition informed pricing & relative cost < 0.01 10.03 
Competition informed pricing & competitive intensity < 0.01 16.36 
Competition informed pricing & market performance < 0.01 8.58 
Cost-informed pricing & relative service advantage - - 
Cost-informed pricing & relative cost - - 
Cost-informed pricing & competitive intensity 0.02 5.65 
Cost-informed pricing & market performance - - 
Relative service advantage & relative cost < 0.01 10.00 
Relative service advantage & competitive intensity 0.05 3.79 
Relative service advantage & market performance - - 
Relative cost & competitive intensity < 0.01 7.73 
Relative cost & market performance 0.02 5.28 
Competitive intensity & market performance < 0.01 15.14 
 
Ingenbleek et al. (2013) did also check for social resonse bias, since managers may tend 
to justify their prices based on cost (Foxall 1972; Ingenbleek et al. 2003). For this thesis, 
social response bias has not been checked for because of a lack of willing respondents as well 
as time constraints. Notably, no social response bias was found by Ingenbleek et al. (2013). 
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6.3 Interpretation of Observable Effects 
For the first proposition, that value-informed pricing has an unconditional positive effect 
of market performance, a simple scatterplot with both variables were analyzed. The 
scatterplot can be found in figure 7.  
Figure 7. Effect of Value-Informed Pricing on Market Performance. 
 
Interpreting the scatterplot, it seems like it could be possible to have a significant 
positive effect with a greater sample. Since the scales have been centered, the mean values of 
the scales are at zero. It can be seen from the scatterplot that we have some extra variance 
around the means, with some companies reporting higher use of value-informed pricing also 
reporting market performance below the mean. The same goes for some companies reporting 
less value-informed pricing than the mean showing higher market performance than the 
mean. In general, the effect is very weak, while being in the right direction. 
For the second proposition, that as relative cost decreases there is a positive effect of 
cost-informed pricing on market performance, variables were again mean centered. 
Examining a scatterplot with the moderating variable coded into a color scale suggest that 
there could be positive relationship to be found between cost-informed pricing and market 
performance when relative cost is high. This is, however, the opposite of what was expected 
and the indication is very weak. The effect seems to disappear when relative costs are low, 
indicating no relationship. Taken at face value, the results here are inconclusive. The effect 
can be studied in figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Effect of Cost-Informed Pricing and Relative Cost on Market Performance. 
 
The third proposition states that higher relative service advantage could moderate a 
higher positive impact of value-informed pricing on relative price. Interestingly enough, 
examining a scatterplot illustrating the simple effect of value-informed pricing on relative 
price, a burst in variance is found at high values of value-informed pricing. This is illustrated 
in figure 9. 
Figure 9. Effect of Value-Informed Pricing and Relative Service Advantage on Relative Price. 
 
 
As seen from figure 9, there are four respondents reporting higher use of value-informed 
pricing than the mean while still reporting a lower relative price even if they report a higher 
relative service advantage than the mean. This might be a cause of penetration pricing 
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strategies, as companies could try to push for market share rather than high initial profits if 
the market potential is large (Dean, 1976; Deeter and Jung, 2013). There is only six 
observations of companies reporting a lower relative service advantage than the mean. The 
relationship between these observations is, however, positive. One must be careful not to 
draw any hasted conclusions from such few observations, since the relationships could be 
highly influenced by outliers. The promising side is that the variations found in the data can 
be explained by theory, should the following be true: Value-informed pricing has a positive 
effect on relative price when relative service advantage is low, but when relative service 
advantage is high some companies pursue penetration pricing strategies which causes high 
variance in relative price when value-informed pricing and relative service advantage are 
high. 
The fourth proposition stated that with higher relative service advantage, the negative 
impact of cost-informed pricing on relative price would increase. Examining a scatterplot of 
cost-informed pricing on relative price, with color-coding for the moderating variable, it is 
seen that this effect could be plausible. The relationships can be observed in figure 10. 
Figure 10. Effect of Cost-Informed Pricing and Relative Service Advantage on Relative Price. 
 
As seen in the scatterplot, by eliminating green points having lower relative service 
advantage than the mean, there is a negative relationship to be observed, with reservation to 
the few data points. This might be an indication that the proposition could possibly hold up 
should a greater sample be collected. 
Lastly, the effects of competitive intensity on relative price and market performance were 
studied. Since the simple effect showed a football-type pattern, it was decided to include 
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relative service advantage as a moderating variable. This was done to identify if the effect of 
competitive intensity behaved differently at levels of relative service advantage above or 
below the mean. The relationships can be studied in figure 11. 
Figure 11. Effect of Competitive Intensity on Relative Price. 
 
As seen from figure 11, no meaningful relationships can be identified based on this data. 
Hence, no indication of competitive intensity affecting relative price is found. However, as 
seen from figure 12, a negative effect of competitive intensity on market performance could 
be plausible.  
Figure 12. Simple Effect of Competitive Intensity on Market Performance. 
 
The effect is not clear, and there is an outlier present, but the data shows a behavior that 
is supported by the literature. Hence, the results look weak, but promising.  
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6.4 Further Exploratory Findings 
Based on what was found during the exploration of the propositions’ viability, some 
further exploration of the data was performed. It seems that the simple effect of relative cost 
have a significant positive impact on relative price, a single variable regression of relative 
cost on relative price did indeed render significant results on a 5 % level with a p-value of 
0.03 and an estimator strength of 0.34. A scatterplot can be found in figure 13. 
Figure 13. Simple Effect of Relative Cost on Relative Price. 
 
Managers might be tempted to justify their prices based on cost (Foxall, 1972), as it has 
proven to be seen as a fair reason by consumers (Thaler, 1985). These results then could be 
an indication that social response bias could be present in the data. Alternatively, since 
relative cost is the strongest predictor of relative price, managers might put less emphasis on 
relative price when evaluating new service performance and instead aim for quick market 
adoption. Then, it could be reasonable that only services with higher relative costs need to 
charge higher relative prices which could emphasize this relationship. 
Since managers have to do a trade-off between market performance and relative price, 
another analysis was performed with market performance as the dependent variable, relative 
service advantage as the independent variable and relative price as a moderating variable. 
Note, that relative service advantage did not show any relevant effects per se. By combining 
the effects of relative service advantage and relative price, however, there is a moderating 
effect to be observed. This is illustrated in figure 14. 
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Figure 14. Effect of Relative Service Advantage and Relative Price on Market Performance. 
 
As can be seen from the plot, there is a positive relationship between relative service 
advantage and market performance when the relative price is low. With a higher relative 
price, however, the equation turns on its head and now there is no relationship, or even a 
negative relationship, between relative service advantage and market performance. This 
relationship is proved by the moderated regression results below in table 10.This illustrates 
the issue of overcharging for services, as it effectively can undermine the positive effect of a 
positively differentiated service. However, one must take into consideration that there is an 
omitted variable in the form of value transparency. How prominent the company is in 
communicating their service’s differential value to customers should also have an effect on 
market performance. Indeed, the relative service advantage effect on market performance 
works as hypothesized when relative price is low.  
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7 Discussion 
There were three research questions stated in the introduction of this thesis. This section 
will answer these questions explicitly one by one. Thereafter follows sections on managerial 
implications of the study, suggestions for future research topics and lastly a concluding 
section discussing the limitations, validity, and reliability of the study. 
The first research question was: “What insights for new digital service pricing are there 
to be gained from the pricing literature?” To answer this question, ten pricing frameworks 
from 1950 – 2016 and supporting literature were examined. Older frameworks were included 
to clearly capture effects that stay valid regardless of the distribution channel. These 
frameworks typically focused on pricing as a part of the marketing mix and as an important 
tool in the competitive landscape. Later frameworks emphasize the importance of identifying 
the value created for the customers, and the importance of choosing the pricing model best 
aligned with how this value is created for the customers. The findings were summarized in a 
four part model that could assist in new digital service pricing. 
Summarized, companies introducing a new digital service should start by careful 
analysis of how the service creates value for the customers and how usage affects perceived 
value, so that the appropriate value drivers can be identified. The customer base should then 
be segmented on these differences in buying motivation. Next, the company should examine 
its strategic goals and objectives in order to align pricing with these objectives. Important 
considerations are the identification of a company’s competitive advantage, or the lack of 
one, and the degree of competitive intensity, total market potential and how transparent the 
differential value delivered is to the customers. Once these foundations for pricing decisions 
have been considered, the competitive price range should be identified. It is important to 
carefully assess competitive reactions at different points in this price range as well as 
identifying price-volume trade-offs. Lastly, when establishing the final set of prices, firms 
should take behavioral effects such as perceived fairness into account. Notably, pricing 
should be planned for the whole life-cycle. For some digital services, this can mean for the 
foreseeable future, while other services, such as games, can have a more defined life-cycle. 
When choosing pricing strategy for profit maximization, firms should also plan what pricing 
tactics they plan on using. Firms should make sure that discounts encourage desirable 
customer behavior, and not only win sales at a lower price. Different bundling and 
unbundling options can be experimented with in order to find the optimal service bundle for 
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the customers. Notably, the pricing function is cross-functional and requires cooperation 
across business units to succeed. For example, cooperation between pricing and research and 
development units can lead to services that better serve customers and hence are able to 
command a higher price. Generally, companies should take a holistic approach to new service 
pricing and allow information to stream in all directions in order to find value maximizing 
approaches on a company-wide level. Pricing information such as customers’ willingness-to-
pay for services and individual features are valuable for several company functions and 
provide a good base for communication between functions in the same way as company 
strategy and objectives should be informed to pricing decisions makers. 
The second research question was: “How should the conceptual framework by 
Ingenbleek et al. (2013) be changed to be more suitable for research on digital service 
pricing?” This question had to be answered in two steps. The first a priori step was based on 
findings in the literature, while the second step was based on findings in the empirical 
research. These findings are presented under further research topics. First, a completely new 
scale for cost-informed pricing was developed based on theory found in the literature. Out of 
four items included in the survey, two were kept. These were related to the price-necessary 
for break-even and to the cost of future capacity increases. The scale for relative cost was 
also modified based on theory found in the literature. First, manufacturing costs were 
naturally removed. Then, cost of capacity increases was added. After purification, the 
remaining items were related to total costs and cost of future capacity increases. Lastly, the 
single item scale for relative price was modified based on expert opinion. The final version of 
the item included jargon from the gaming industry: “Please indicate your average unique 
purchase value, or price, relative to your market.” 
The third research question was; “What best-practices can be identified?” As a cause of 
the small sample obtained, no validating statistical testing could be performed in good faith. 
Hence, only exploratory analysis of proposed effects with support in the literature was 
performed. Based on this exploratory analysis, it seems plausible that there could be a 
positive effect of value-informed pricing on market performance, in line with Ingenbleek et 
al. (2013). Exploring the third proposition, that higher relative service advantage moderates a 
stronger positive effect of value-informed pricing on relative price, we find an interesting 
implication for future research. There seems to be increased variance on relative price at 
high-values of value-informed pricing when relative service advantage is high. It is my belief 
that this is due to an omitted variable, market potential. Accordingly, the findings were not in 
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line with the findings by Ingenbleek et al. (2013) for reasons hypothesized above. If the 
relative service advantage is high, and market potential is high, a company would be wise to 
consider some form of penetration pricing which would undoubtedly have a negative impact 
on relative price as per definition. Since digital services companies also often show high 
gross margins, the price-volume trade-off might also be cheaper for companies in this 
industry, causing downwards pressure on prices for services with higher market potential. 
The fourth proposition that the negative impact of cost-informed pricing on relative price 
would increase as relative service advantage increases seems plausible, with respect to the 
small sample. This is in line with the findings by Ingenbleek et al. (2013). Competitive 
intensity looks like it could have a negative impact on market performance, though the 
relationship is quite weak. At the mean, the variance is much larger making interpretation 
hard. It also seems that managers might justify their prices disproportionally much from 
costs, as relative costs have a significant positive impact on relative price. This might be a 
cause of social response bias, and is something that would need to be addressed in further 
research. The other option, that relative price is not necessarily the best suited outcome 
variable, is something that could be solved by including a construct for market potential. 
Interestingly, there was no significant relationship between relative service advantage and 
market performance. Relative service advantage has been one of the strongest indicators of 
market performance historically (Henard and Szymanski, 2001). By including a third 
dimension relative price, however, a careful positive relationship is found when relative price 
is low. This is seen as support of the supporting role of relative service advantage on market 
performance. There are several reasons for why this relationship does not hold when relative 
price is high. First, there is the price-volume trade-off that naturally decreases the chances of 
high market performance at higher prices. Second, overestimation of the relative service 
advantage could cause managers to price their service higher than the customers are willing 
to pay. This misunderstanding of differential value could also cause management to set goals 
that are hard to achieve at that particular price level, which would cause the respondents 
reports of less than expected market performance. Mainly as a cause of the small sample, no 
clear identification of best-practices can be made. Instead, the findings are used as 
implications of what future research could be appropriate. 
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7.1 Managerial Implications 
Managers can utilize the model presented in the theoretical section of this thesis as a 
bullet point checklist to make more informed pricing decisions. As this model is a summary 
of useful information from ten other options presented, along with supporting literature, it is 
my belief that this model could be highly useful. Also, the exploratory findings of the best 
practices show promising, but very careful, results for the positive effects of value-informed 
pricing. There is also weak support for a negative effect of cost-informed pricing when 
relative service advantage is high. 
7.2 Further Research Topics 
For future research, I recommend the inclusion of a market potential construct in the 
conceptual framework. New digital services with high market potential might strive for swift 
market adoption, and this would mean that a service with high relative service advantage 
could show a low relative price. This effect would also be present even if high values of 
value-informed pricing practices were obtained. This effect is not currently captured by the 
conceptual framework. It is my belief that this effect is more significant for rapidly scalable 
digital services that for ordinary products and services. Another effect not currently captured 
by the conceptual framework by Ingenbleek et al. (2013) is value transparency and how well 
a company handles this issue through value communication strategies. The proposed effect is 
naturally that low differential value transparency would have a negative effect on relative 
price and market performance. Value transparency could possibly be approximated by 
customer familiarity with the service and the degree to which a service can be identified as an 
experience good. 
It could also be rewarding to rethink the outcome variables. Drawing on the theoretical 
framework developed, the outcome variable should be total discounted lifetime profits. Since 
these are unobtainable a priori, or even (as in this case) a year after market launch, some 
approximation is needed. Are then relative price and market performance as compared to 
objectives suitable outcome variables as approximation for total discounted lifetime profits? 
It is my belief that the inclusion of a market potential construct could alleviate the problem. 
Briefly, total discounted lifetime profits should be dependent on the price itself (or relative 
price), the total market potential, how fast this potential can be reached and how well it can 
be maintained, moderated by the service, cost and competition characteristics included as 
before. It would be most intriguing to see if such an approximation could be created. Lastly, 
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there seems to be some issues in the definition of “price” as an outcome variable. A step 
forward was taken in this study, specifying price as the unique average purchase value rather 
than as a single price, but further steps needs to be taken in order to better capture the benefits 
of pricing tactics and bundling options. It is my belief that these issues are especially 
important for digital services, as digital services many times can be sold as versions of the 
same service for different prices. Then, the bundling of features into these service packages 
becomes a most pressing issue in maximizing profitability. 
7.3 Limitations, Validity, and Reliability 
As pricing is an extensive cross-functional topic, the research here has had to be 
severely limited. Topics and issues in the literature review have been explored from a 
conceptual view from afar. Hence, there is no deep dive into the topics of pricing strategy, 
pricing models, value-based segmentation, cannibalization, product-service line and bundling 
tactics and strategies. Notably, several of these limitations severely restrict the research 
impact specific for digital services.  
The empirical part of this thesis is conducted as exploratory research and should be 
interpreted as such. There are some reliability issues with the thesis, mostly in the form of the 
small sample the empirical research is based upon. On the other hand, the scales used are all, 
except for one, based on existing scales, which puts greater trust in the reliability of the study. 
Notably, all scales show good factor loadings and reliabilities, with the exception of some 
weakness in the established and unaltered value-informed pricing and relative service 
advantage scales. As stated before, I suspect there are some validity issues especially in the 
form of the outcome variables. They might be decent approximations, especially for physical 
products and services, but I suspect they miss some crucial characteristics of the desirable 
outcomes for digital services which are more rapidly scalable. The data might be subject to 
social response bias as shown through the strong relationship between relative cost and 
relative price. On the other hand, only senior executives were contacted for the survey, which 
ensures that the data should be well aligned with the true intentions of the company.  
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Appendix A: Scale Items 
“To what degree were the following factors included in the price-setting process of the new 
service? In other words, to what extent did you take into account the following elements 
while determining the price of the new product/service? (1 = was not important at all in price 
setting, 5 = played a major role in price setting)” 
Value-informed pricing 
X3. The advantages the new service offers to the customer 
X4. The balance between advantages of the service and the possible price (price-quality 
comparison) 
X5. The advantages of the product/service offers, as compared with competitors’ 
services 
Competition-informed pricing 
X6. The price of competitors’ services 
X7. The degree of competition on the market 
X8. The competitors’ current price strategy 
X9. The market structure (number and strength of competitors) 
Cost-informed pricing 
X10. Target return on investment 
X11. The price necessary for break-even 
X12. The total cost of the service 
X13. Costs of future capacity increases 
“How do you estimate the relative advantages of this product/service as compared with 
competitors’ products services for… (1 = no relative advantage, 5 = very high advantage)” 
Relative Service Advantage 
X14. Service quality 
X15. Expressing trustworthiness and expertise 
X16. Reliability of the service 
X17. Overall advantage of the service 
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“How do you estimate the relative costs of this service as compared with competitors’ 
services, for… (1 = very low relative costs, 5 = very high relative costs)” 
Relative Costs 
X18. Marketing costs, including customer acquisition costs 
X19. Research and development costs 
X20. Total costs 
X21. Cost of capacity increases 
“Rate the extent to which the following changes occur in the market on which you launched 
the service…  1 = little to no extent, 5 = to a very high extent” 
Competitive Intensity 
X22. Changes in services offered by your competitors  
X23. Changes in sales strategies by your competitors 
X24. Changes in sales promotion / advertising strategies by your competitors 
“Rate the extent to which the service has achieved the following outcomes (compared with 
their predetermined or expected objectives) during the first 12 months after launch of the 
service… 5= was completely reached, 1 = was not reached at all)” 
Market Performance 
X25. The degree to which the product satisfies a customer want or need as compared 
with the objective or expectation 
X26. Sales to current customers as compared with the objective or expectation 
X27. Sales to new customers as compared with the objective or expectation 
X28. Market share as compared with the objective or expectation 
X29. Degree to which the product offers a competitive advantage as compared with the 
objective or expectation 
Relative Price 
X30. Please indicate your average unique purchase value, or price, relative to your 
market. 
 
 
 
